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ABSTRACT 
Cyber security is one of the main topics that are discussed around the world today. The 
threat is real, and it is unlikely to diminish. People, business, governments, and even armed 
forces are networked in a way or another. Thus, the cyber threat is also facing military 
networking. On the other hand, the concept of Network Centric Warfare sets high 
requirements for military tactical data communications and security. A challenging 
networking environment and cyber threats force us to consider new approaches to build 
security on the military communication systems. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a cyber security architecture for military networks, 
and to evaluate the designed architecture. The architecture is described as a technical 
functionality. As a new approach, the thesis introduces Cognitive Networks (CN) which are 
a theoretical concept to build more intelligent, dynamic and even secure communication 
networks. The cognitive networks are capable of observe the networking environment, 
make decisions for optimal performance and adapt its system parameter according to the 
decisions. As a result, the thesis presents a five-layer cyber security architecture that 
consists of security elements controlled by a cognitive process. The proposed architecture 
includes the infrastructure, services and application layers that are managed and controlled 
by the cognitive and management layers. The architecture defines the tasks of the security 
elements at a functional level without introducing any new protocols or algorithms. 
 
For evaluating two separated method were used. The first method is based on the SABSA 
framework that uses a layered approach to analyze overall security of an organization. The 
second method was a scenario based method in which a risk severity level is calculated. 
The evaluation results show that the proposed architecture fulfills the security requirements 
at least at a high level. However, the evaluation of the proposed architecture proved to be 
very challenging. Thus, the evaluation results must be considered very critically. The thesis 
proves the cognitive networks are a promising approach, and they provide lots of benefits 
when designing a cyber security architecture for the tactical military networks. However, 
many implementation problems exist, and several details must be considered and studied 
during the future work.  
KEY WORDS 
Cyber security, cyber threat, cognitive networks, security architecture, architecture 
evaluation, military networks, communication networks 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Lots of speak about cyber security and its importance have occurred in recent years 
worldwide. The various players have expressed cyber security the most significant factor in 
the near future. Many countries have drawn up cyber security strategies and the question 
arises how the cyber threats should take precaution. Cyber security is not only for 
governmental or business actors, but it is related to everyone's daily activities. 
The internet and networks are revolutionizing our society worldwide by giving people, 
business and military new ways to work and co-operate with one another. This will drive the 
expansion of cyberspace. The networks on which everyone now relies for daily business 
transcend organizational and national boundaries. Cyberspace has become a domain where 
strategic or operational advantages of business or even military can be won or lost. The 
growing usage of cyberspace means that its disruption can affect armed forces’ ability to 
function effectively during a crisis.[92] 
Events in cyberspace occur at high speed. Traditional responses may not be sufficient to 
protect critical infrastructure and services. Although risks in cyberspace can be managed in 
several ways, they do not often match this complex and dynamic environment. Increasing 
dependence on cyberspace brings new benefits but also new threats. Cyber intrusions and 
attacks have increased dramatically over the last decade, exposing sensitive personal and 
business information, disrupting critical operations, and imposing high costs on the economy. 
While cyberspace raises open markets and open societies, this very openness can also make 
business and military actors more vulnerable to criminals, hackers, and foreign intelligence 
services who try to compromise or damage the critical systems. [92] 
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Security architectures and controls of legacy military networks were not built to face the new 
threats. Traditionally, the military networks were isolated from other networks, and access to 
them was very limited both to geographical areas and a number of authorized users. Physical 
security means played an enormous role in these systems and networks. In the legacy systems, 
security controls are often built after the network and service implementation causing 
vulnerabilities and potential threats. A holistic view to information and cyber security has 
been missing. 
At the same time with growing cyber security threats, military troops are more dependent on 
networks and services than ever. A huge growth has occurred for example with situational 
awareness systems which all require reliable communications networks and servers. Today, 
all military capability areas (weapon systems, targeting, etc.) are related to information 
technology and applications. Usage of commercial technologies when providing these 
services means that the cyberspace threats of the internet are relevant threats also to the IT 
military systems. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has increased the significance of military communication 
networks during last decades. NCW is an operational concept enabling information 
superiority in which the main idea is to increase military combat power by networking the 
battlefield actors from perspective of processes, operations and information sharing [7]. NCW 
is primarily an operational model, but communication networks play an important role as an 
enabler of networking activities and information sharing. 
From NCW and cyber security perspectives, Cognitive Networks (CN) is an interesting 
research area. These intelligent and self-learning cognitive networks are believed to generate 
more performance also for military networking systems. The cognitive networks are simply 
smart communications networks (made up of a network nodes, and wired and wireless 
connections between them) that are able to be aware of the network’s internal and 
environmental situation [58]. CN has an ability to operate independently, make decisions and 
adapt according to the given goal. A key feature is learning which means that the network can 
exploit previously made decisions during a cognitive process. 
From a military point of view, CN is a promising concept. On the battlefield, tactical 
cognitive networks would adapt automatically according to environmental changes. Network 
resources could be used dynamically and effectively. Network administration and 
configuration would no longer require human operators or manual configuration. 
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However, the cognitive networks may face the same cyber security threats than traditional 
networks, because data transmission in these networks is based on common and standardized 
network and link protocols. A management process of a cognitive network may bring even 
more cyber security challenges. The cognitive networks with a decision making process, 
sensors and adaptive layers are more complex, and thus enable new types of cyber attacks. An 
adversary may launch cyber attacks to influence e.g. sensor input data, information sharing 
between nodes, or the decision-making process. 
This thesis focuses on architectural security aspects of military networks. The main purpose 
of the thesis is to consider how the features of cognitive networks could be used for building 
and designing a cyber security architecture for military communications networks. The cyber 
security architecture describes all the security functionalities and controls that are required 
when implementing the high-secure military networks. Cognitive features will create more 
knowledge on networks which could mean better performance, resource usage and higher 
security, but CNs may also push up new security threats, especially in a tactical battlefield 
environment. Growing cyber security threat demands that security requirements are already 
considered in the beginning of the network designing process. Thus, it is relevant and 
necessary to create a cyber security architecture that could be utilized at a starting point when 
modern military networks are planned and implemented. 
1.1. Related Research 
Related work consists of published books and research papers about cognitive networks, 
cyber security and network security. Cognitive networks are currently studied in various 
research programs. Previously, research was focusing more on the cognitive radios and 
spectral efficiency and usage of them, but now cognitive features are spread to an entire 
communication system and all the layers of a networking device. Cognitive networks research 
focuses largely on the decision-making mechanisms, and communication and optimization 
between the layers (cross-layer functionality). The basic idea behind the cognitive network is 
presented in the research papers by R. Thomas et al [95], [96][97]. A book called Cognitive 
radio communications and networks: principles and practice [105] explores the state-of-the-
art in cognitive networks, compiling a roadmap to future research. It also covers cognitive 
radios with semantic aspects. 
      4 
Network security is also a widely studied research field. The latest research and future 
developments of network security are provided in books Network Security: Current Status 
and Future Directions [30] and Principles of Information Security [103]. These books cover a 
wide range of topics dealing with secure routing, firewall design, mobile agent security, 
Bluetooth security, wireless sensor networks, and digital content security. Research papers 
dealing with cognitive network security mainly focus on the traditional security problems 
with a narrow sector or they have a very limited problem statement (e.g. access control, 
encryption, etc.). 
For example, a research paper written by J. L. Burbank [14] discusses the topic of wireless 
security in cognitive radio networks, delineating the key challenges of wireless cognitive 
networks. The paper declares that securing the decision-making process is fundamental to a 
cognitive radio. G. Safdar and M. O'Neill [82] present a novel framework for providing 
common control channel security for co-operatively communicating cognitive radio nodes. 
The paper considers how cognitive radio network nodes can authenticate each other prior to 
any confidential channel negotiations to ensure protection against cyber attacks. 
Also, Yi Peng et al [106] discuss security of cognitive radio networks. The paper proposes a 
novel architecture in which the dynamic radio channel access is reached by a cross-layer 
design between the physical and MAC layers. The research paper also shows by simulations 
that a novel centralized dynamic channel access mechanism can improve network 
performance. A problem with these previous references is that they are related to security of 
cognitive radio networks. It is challenging to find research papers (at least from IEEE Digital 
Library) concerning general cognitive networks and their overall security design. None of 
these research articles presents a high-level architectural view including security controls and 
functions for all layers and services. 
Lots of cyber security and cyber threat related research papers are published during last years. 
Naturally, this research has also produced several books. Many of the books consider other 
than technical aspects of cyber security but we can find a few that focus on technology. Cyber 
threats are widely covered in books Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for 
Security Practitioners [10], Strategic Cyber Security [39], Inside Cyber Warfare [16], and 
Cyber Security Essentials [41]. Cyber threats on cognitive networking are discussed for 
example by A. Fragkiadakis et al [36], Yuan Zhang et al [108] and Qingqi Peiet al [78]. 
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1.2. Research Objective, Methodology and Structure 
The main research objective is to describe a cyber security architecture with functional 
properties for military networks using the features of cognitive networking. A major goal is to 
design an overall architecture that includes sufficient security functionalities and controls to 
protect information processing and sharing especially in tactical military networking.  
 
Figure 1: Research process. 
The research framework of the thesis is concretized through the research process that is 
depicted in Figure 1. The figure also illustrates the structure of this study that consists of the 
environment, analysis, problem, solution and evaluation phases. First, two environmental 
entities (networking in a military environment, cyber security threats) are studied resulting the 
analysis of security requirements and current cyber threats on military networks. The purpose 
is to show what kind of requirements Network Centric Warfare and a challenging operating 
environment set to military networking, and what the security goals of military networking 
are. After the environmental study, the current cyber threat is examined to present the picture 
of the latest information about the characteristics of cyber space, cyber warfare, threat 
concerning tactical military networks and the challenges legacy networks face. 
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Once the environment and cyber threats are analyzed, the features of cognitive networks are 
explained in the solution phase. This part of the study describes what the cognitive networks 
are, how they work, and what benefits they would bring to networking and especially its 
security design. The cognitive network concept is used as a basis when the cyber security 
architecture for military networks is designed in the next phase. Finally, the proposed cyber 
security architecture is evaluated using a scenario based evaluation and Sherwood Applied 
Business Security Architecture (SABSA) based approaches in the evaluation phase. The aim 
is to show how the designed architecture meets the requirements that were set in the 
beginning of the study. 
The main research problem of this study is: 
What are the overall design and functionalities of the cyber security architecture for military 
networking using the features of the cognitive networks? 
 The sub research questions are: 
What are the requirements for military communications networks in the environment of 
network centric environment? 
What are the security requirements for military networks? 
What are the main cyber security threats to military networking? 
What are the challenges of legacy military networks? 
What are the cognitive networks and how do they function? 
What kind is the overall cyber security architecture and what are the functional properties of 
the architecture? 
What are the security functions and controls of the infrastructure, service and application 
layers? 
How could the designed architecture be evaluated, and how does the architecture meet the 
desired requirements? 
The research methodology mainly consists of literature analysis and planning. Security 
requirements and goals, and the characteristics of the cognitive networks are developed by 
using literature analysis. The thesis utilizes the planning method in the development of the 
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cyber security architecture. Also, a method of  mathematical analysis is used in the evaluation 
of the proposed architecture. 
The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. The first chapter is introduction, and the 
second chapter considers networking in military environments. The chapter presents the 
requirements of NCW and tactical networking, and introduces the design goals and security 
dimensions for military networking systems. In the third chapter, cyberspace, cyber warfare 
and cyber security threats are studied, and the cyber threat scenarios are presented. Also, the 
challenges of the legacy systems are discussed. The fourth chapter describes the basic 
properties of the cognitive networks, and the challenges for networking in battlefield 
conditions. The fifth chapter proposes a cyber security architecture with the functional layers 
and security elements. In the sixth chapter, the proposed architecture is evaluated against the 
predefined scenarios. The seventh chapter concludes the study by representing the main 
findings of the thesis, discussion, and the future work. 
1.3. Perspective and Scope 
The main research perspective is to provide an architecture with technical functionality. The 
architecture describes technical security controls and functionalities required for secure 
military networking. In this study, a goal is to generate a cyber security architecture according 
to security requirements and other boundary conditions for secure military networking. The 
research perspective is also technical cyber security which means that political, law and 
business aspects are not considered. The architecture is designed for a tactical level 
networking. 
The main scope is to design an overall architectural view with the description of the security 
features, and evaluate the proposed architecture. The purpose is to study how cognitive 
features could be utilized to provide more secure military networking. The architecture is a 
high level design, and it does not include algorithm or protocol level details. Implementation 
challenges and possibilities are discussed, but not analyzed in details. 
1.4. Definitions 
Cyberspace consists of computers (including programmable circuits), and the connections 
between them forming a virtual dimension. Cyberspace is the global network of 
interdependent information technology infrastructures, telecommunications networks and 
computer processing systems [93]. In cyberspace, individuals can interact, exchange ideas, 
share information, provide social support, trade, create various types of media, play games, 
participate in policy debate, etc, using the global network [92]. 
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Cyber Defense includes actions that combine information assurance, computer network 
defense (to include response actions), and critical infrastructure protection with enabling 
capabilities to prevent, detect, and ultimately respond to an adversaries ability to deny or 
manipulate information and/or infrastructure. [10] 
Cyber Security is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s 
assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, 
infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of 
transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. [72] 
Military communication ensures that commanders and staffs at all levels are able to maintain 
continuous control of subordinate forces under any conditions and to communicate signals to 
the forces at the proper time concerning the threat of enemy attack and the implementation of 
combat readiness. The chief demands made on military communications are timeliness of 
establishment, reliability of operations, speed of action, and secrecy of transmitted 
information. [60] 
Cognitive network is defined as a network with a cognitive process that can perceive current 
network conditions, plan, decide, act on those conditions, learn from the consequences of its 
actions, all while following end-to-end goals. The cognition loop senses the environment, 
plans actions according to sensor input data and network policies, decides which scenario fits 
best its end-to-end purpose using a reasoning engine, and finally acts on the chosen scenario 
as discussed in the previous section. The system learns from the past (situations, plans, 
decisions, actions) and uses this knowledge to improve the decisions in the future. [95] 
Security architecture refers to cohesive security design, which takes into account security 
requirements and objectives (e.g. confidentiality, non-repudiation, authentication, 
authorization, etc.). The architecture addresses the risks of a particular environment/scenario, 
and specifies what security controls are to be applied where. The design process must be 
repeatable. [98] 
Cyber warfare refers to actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or 
networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption. Cyber warfare is politically 
motivated hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage to an enemy. [21] 
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Network Centric Warfare is an operating concept enabling information superiority, which 
develops growing battle power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to 
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of decision-making, higher operation speed, 
lethality, probability of survival and self-synchronization. [7] 
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2. NETWORKING IN A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
A military networking environment, especially at the tactical level, is very challenging. At the 
same time, the paradigm and doctrine of Network Centric Warfare [7] increases demands on 
military communications and networking. This chapter concentrates on reviewing Network 
Centric Warfare and its requirements for information systems and networks. The chapter also 
describes the design goals of tactical military networks, and defines the security dimensions 
which act as the criteria for information and networking security in the military networks. 
2.1. Network Centric Warfare 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), also called network-centric operations [104], is a military 
doctrine and also a war theory developed by the United States Department of Defense in the 
1990s. The goal of NCW is to convert an information advantage, enabled in part by 
information technology, into a competitive advantage through the robust networking of well-
informed geographically distributed forces. NCW networking combined with changes in 
technology, organization, processes, and people may allow new forms of organizational 
behavior. 
As a solid concept, NCW was first time described in 1998 by the U.S. Naval Institute's 
journal, and more deeply in the same year in a book called Network Centric Warfare by 
Garstka, Alberts, and Stein [7].  The central network warfare is defined as information age 
warfare where the theory can be summarized through four tenets in its hypothesis [7]. These 
are: 
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing 
2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational 
awareness 
3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and 
enhances sustainability and speed of command 
4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 
As it is noticed from these four tenets, information sharing is a key element to operational 
success. Without an effective and continuous distribution of information the other basic tenets 
(2 - 4) will lose their meaning. 
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Figure 2 shows the value chain created from the basic tenets [7]. The value chain attempts to 
describe achievement of effectiveness and advantages of NCW through four tenets. In the 
figure, it is important to notice how the enablers (shared information and improved 
awareness) allow virtual collaboration and organizations that finally lead to increased tempo 
and responsiveness. 
 
Figure 2: The chain of value. 
The value chain starts with an information structure, which allows the processes that give a 
significantly better competitive environment by generating and sharing situational awareness 
through the entire organization. In turn, this improved awareness enables to create a number 
of processes which utilize this knowledge in such a way that the end result is improved. In 
war fighting, these results are increased battle speed (tempo), lower risks and costs (losses) 
and improved efficiency. 
In the book called Understanding Information Age Warfare [8], published in 2001, the 
concept was further developed by building an operational theory of NCW. The key concept of 
the book is information superiority. The theory was developed by examining the perception of 
the environment in three domains which are physical, information and cognitive. 
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Events that can be detected by a sensor and an individual occur in the physical domain. The 
physical domain consists of the land, sea, air and space environments where the troops carry 
out operations. The communication networks combining the forces are also located in the 
physical domain. Data created in the physical domain is transported through the information 
domain. In the information domain, information is created, modified and shared. 
Collaboration, communications and commanding between the units take place in the 
information domain. 
Sensors, data generated by them, and the analyzed information are situated in the information 
domain. Data is received and processed in the cognitive domain, where the data is valuated 
for a basis for further action. The cognitive domain is a fighter's mind. The elements of this 
domain include leadership, morale, level of education and experience, as well as situational 
awareness. Figure 3 shows the value chain linking information superiority and the above-
mentioned domains. 
 
Figure 3: The value chain links of information superiority and NCW 
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Networks allow forces to gain and exploit information leading to information superiority, but 
achieving knowledge superiority requires that the C2 systems are able to provide shared 
awareness in the cognitive domain. Shared awareness enables the execution of joint forces 
and operations resulting in the full spectrum dominance in the physical domain. 
The original NCW paradigm has been criticized for the admiration of technology and 
technology-driven development. The truth is that developing the concept was guided by new 
technologies for a long time. However, the recent war experience by the United States has 
demonstrated the current technology constraints in implementing the NCW concept. A large 
amount of information and superior information systems did not automatically mean 
information superiority. 
Although NCW sets high requirements for information sharing, it is still believed that 
information networks and services may provide superiority by enabling better situational 
awareness, and more effective information sharing and processing. Even though social 
networking and human’s role have been increasing, it is still seen that information sharing and 
communications systems play a vital, increasing role of building networks between the actors 
in the battle space. The effective linking of forces means that distributed units can generate 
synergy, and responsibility and current tasks can be dynamically reallocated to adapt to the 
situation. Effective information sharing requires the establishment of a robust, high-
performance information communications systems and networks that are able to provide all 
required services for the warfighters. [104] 
2.2. Military Networking Environment 
The military networks function under extreme circumstances. The networks are deployed in 
harsh environments where temperature, weather and other factors set high requirements for 
functioning. For wireless communication, the movement of troops brings a challenge with the 
mobility of the networks. In addition to that, the military networks are located in a hostile 
environment, where an active adversary is always present. Hence, for network availability and 
usability, it is important that the networks are well secured from external and internal attacks.  
Today’s military networks are more and more based on legacy commercial technologies and 
protocols. Military specific technology is costly, and it requires special knowledge for 
maintenance and configuration. However, in a situation where commercial technologies do 
not fulfill the high-level military specifications, some modifications and development of 
commercial products are conducted. Thus, commercial hardware, applications and protocols 
are widely used from the strategic to even the tactical level of military networking. 
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Figure 4: Characteristics of legacy military tactical networks. 
For communications, the tactical environment or level of military operations is the most 
challenging. Figure 4 presents some fundamental characteristics of legacy military tactical 
networks. The network consists of nodes and communication links between them. It is 
essential to notice that the performance of these nodes and links is not as high as the 
performance of commercial or fixed networks. On the tactical level, basic communication 
infrastructure is based on combat network radios, mobile (typically IP) nodes and long-haul 
radio relays. Bandwidth capacity is low compared to commercial wireless technologies. Also, 
some specifications are not that important in the commercial systems. 
Typically, a combat network provides the throughput of tens of kilobits per second, while the 
capacity of a radio relay is around two megabits per second.   For example, priority features of 
the tactical network may cause traffic delay because data traffic on these networks may have 
to compete for bandwidth with other services at higher priority. Data traffic may have to 
unexpectedly wait several seconds or more while high-priority voice traffic is carried on the 
same underlying links. Such systems also may also have especially strong infrastructure 
protection requirements [34]. 
Database
2.4 - 19.2 kbps connection
2 – 155 Mbps connection
Network node
Combat Net Radio node
User terminal
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Military information services (servers and applications) are typically built using commercial 
technologies and products. However, some special information services are based on military 
specified protocols, applications and interfaces. Figure 5 illustrates a typical information 
service structure. The figure shows a simplified view of the many protocols that impact 
network communications. It is to be noted this is just a very small portion of the all available 
protocols and applications in use. It is important to realize that the military networks use 
several protocols that are also implemented in commercial networks (e.g. Internet). Each of 
these protocols could create cyber security problems because they are capable of being abused 
by potential adversaries [50]. 
 
Figure 5: An example of military information service structure. 
2.3. Requirements for Military Networks and Information Systems 
The original NCW theory emphasizes the significance of technical networks, but, as already 
noted, the current theory addresses more on human dimensions and processes. Since the 
NCW theory was developed, current research is now aimed more towards operational 
management and planning processes [4], [6]. The role of information technology is to support 
and enable these processes. From a technology development point of view, the trend is 
appropriate, because the clear processes and procedures provide unambiguous requirements 
for technical systems. The technical systems must be adapted to the logic of modern warfare. 
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Figure 6 illustrates how the dimensions of NCW are associated into the requirements for the 
information infrastructure. The cognitive domain sets requirements of how to gain knowledge, 
understanding and awareness. These requirements establish demands in the information 
domain how battlespace monitoring and management is provided. Finally, the most of the 
requirements for the networks are generated from these demands of the functionality of the 
information system. On the other hand, the requirements for the information system are 
generated from the requirements that are derived from the processes and operational needs of 
the physical and information domains.  
 
Figure 6: Deriving the requirements for the information system and networking. 
The requirements of NCW for tactical military communication are challenging. The first 
NCW tenet [7] states that networking is the most important factor in terms of information 
sharing. While networking is not limited only to the technical systems and networks, it can be 
assumed that the technical information systems and communication networks are vital 
enablers to networking and information sharing, especially in distributed operations. The 
main purpose of networking is to build a communications system that integrates all sensors, 
weapon systems and operators to each other throughout the entire battlespace. In addition, 
military operational planning and execution requires that databases are connected into the 
network in such a way the data content is accessible to all stakeholders. The communication 
system should be able to forward information reliably throughout the battlespace from a 
strategic level to a tactical level. 
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Two case study reports by RAND Corporation [40], [74] describe five performance areas for 
information sharing and processing. These are Collaboration, Network Connectivity, 
Discovery and Collection, Network Control and Net-Ready Nodes. Two performance areas 
(Collaboration, and Discovery and Collection) are provided by information processing that 
typically occurs above the networking layer. Thus, the performance areas relevant to data 
transport and communication are: 
1. Connectivity Capability. The ability of the communication network to allow 
warfighters and troops to transmit data and information among themselves and 
databases. 
2. Net-Ready Nodes Capability.  The degree of the ability to connect warfighters and 
troops to the network. 
3. Network Control Capability. The ability to control and adjust the communication 
networks according to the mission conditions and circumstances. 
Table 1 describes these previous capability areas, their factors, measures and requirements for 
military networking in NCW [38], [74]. The purpose of the table is to show how networking 
requirements are derived from three capability areas (connectivity, control and net-readiness). 
The requirements are derived by considering a single factor and its importance to military 
communications. The requirements describe very high level demands from which more 
detailed functional and technical requirements are derived. The technical requirements are 
dependent on an operational concept and use cases that exactly describe how a network 
system is supposed to provide communication and networking capabilities to military troops 
in different battlespace circumstances.  
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Table 1: Requirements for military networking. 
Capability 
Area 
Factor/Measures Requirements for Networking 
Network 
Connectivity 
Connectivity reach - The number of network links 
between all operational entities required to support 
the ongoing mission. 
Connection to all other 
operational entities (nodes), 
also during movement. 
Connectivity robustness - The number of network 
links that can be cut without a loss of desired reach. 
A node has more than one 
network link. Link protocols 
are robust. 
Connectivity capacity. The number of required links 
supporting the ongoing mission with capacity that 
exceeds a preset threshold (kbps). 
Link capacity is sufficient to 
run C2 applications. 
Link security. The number of required links 
supporting the operational function that allow for 
encryption. 
Link security fulfills the 
requirements for information 
content (public-secret). 
Network 
Control 
Monitoring. The degree to which an operational 
function requires a network controller to detect a 
significant change in network status.  
Network control is aware of 
the current status of the 
network. 
Access control. The amount of time in which a 
network controller is able to activate or deactivate 
network access. 
Network access management 
occurs in (almost) real time. 
Bandwidth control. The amount of time in which a 
controller is able to reallocate bandwidth among the 
network's nodes. 
Bandwidth reallocation is 
conducted in real time 
(automatically). 
Reconstitution. The amount of time in which a 
controller is able to find and activate alternative 
communications paths between disconnected 
network nodes. 
A network system has an 
ability to reroute packets and 
establish alternative network 
links. 
Access security. The maximum number of network 
facilities that cannot be penetrated by unauthorized 
users. 
Network devices and links are 
secured against unauthorized 
access. 
Capacity control. The amount of time in which a 
controller is able to add or remove a node from a 
network while maintaining required security and 
timeliness constraints. 
The network system has an 
ability to connect and 
disconnect nodes 
automatically or with a 
minimum manual 
configuration. 
 
Net-Ready 
Nodes 
Access time. The amount of time in which a network 
node is connected to the network. 
A node has a plug-and-play 
function. No manual 
configuration is required when 
the node is connected. 
Node capacity. The maximum bandwidth a network 
node requires being addressable by other nodes in 
the operation. 
Capacity requirements depend 
on the applications running in 
a node. Varies from kbps to 
Mbps. 
Node connectivity. The number of media modes 
(modem, on-the move wireless, high-bandwidth wire, 
etc.) that are supported. 
The network system must 
support all necessary media 
modes. 
Information accessibility. The number of information 
format types (HTML, XML, VMF, etc.) that the 
ongoing operation requires the nodes to support. 
The network system must 
have common network and 
link protocols supporting 
higher level protocols (voice, 
video, data etc.). 
Node security. The number of nodes that the 
ongoing operation requires to support security 
requirements (encryption, ID validation, access, etc.). 
All the nodes must support 
and use required security 
protocols and policies. 
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Networking simply consists of network nodes, links between the nodes and network 
management. Communication links allow the data transfer between the network nodes. From 
a networking point of view, the nodes are functional entities, which are able to process and 
share information with the other nodes, and are capable of mutual cooperation. Thus, 
networking simply refers to the connectivity between force entities. Two network entities are 
connected if either a physical or logical communications channel exists between the two. 
Logical connectivity denotes that the two connected entities are able to communicate directly 
or to communicate indirectly through some other node or nodes. When we discuss functional 
operations, we are normally concerned with logical connectivity. However, operational 
functions also require assessing physical connectivity, because no logical connection exists 
without a physical communication link. Connectivity requirements are a main indicator when 
evaluating network interaction levels. 
A number of those operational entities (nodes) generating information and making decisions 
directly affect the level of interaction. Several units or service components may be required to 
work together or they can be quickly brought together temporally and spatially in order to 
achieve the desired effect. 
Net-ready nodes are operational entities that are capable of connecting to the network to 
support operational functions. Equipping these players to gain access to networks can add to 
operational costs. Net-ready nodes, another measure of network interaction, include both the 
warfighters and the equipment and devices needed to access the network. The level of 
network readiness endures directly on the level of network interaction. Some operational 
functions might require very little direct access to the network while others might require 
considerable access. Readiness can be measured in terms of time, capacity, bandwidth, 
connectivity, information accessibility and level of security required for a warfighter to access 
the network. 
The management and control of a network are extremely important to network based 
operations. Without some control or direction, it is impossible to simply build a network and 
assume subscribers to use it. This is also true for both the network infrastructure and the 
operational functions that use the network. Network control and management functions 
include monitoring changing conditions in the network, determining subscribers’ access to 
other subscribers and network information, resource allocation and reallocation, reconstituting 
the network by rerouting traffic, and enforcing security restrictions on the network. 
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Although a network infrastructure must be robust and reliable, it must also be dynamic so that 
operational actors are able to join the network. The operational actors must be equipped with 
devices including necessary connection capabilities. The net-ready nodes capability requires 
both actors themselves but also communication equipment which interoperable with the other 
nodes. The readiness level of the network nodes directly affects the level of interaction in the 
network. Some of the operational functions may require very little direct access to the 
network, but others may require continuous and unlimited access. 
The NCW requirements culminate in the interoperability of different communication systems. 
The importance of the interoperability is understood when we for example look at the tasks of 
the Finnish Defence Forces [33]. The network system supporting the NCW paradigm should 
be able to connect military troops, governmental authorities and even international partners. 
Interoperability is a significant requirement to conduct planning and management in joint 
operations. NCW will bring these cooperation demands to a very low tactical level, which 
also requires high system and process interoperability. 
Reliability and ease of use are the basic requirements for information systems and networks. 
If a data network is not experienced as reliable, its use can be reduced or ignored at all. Ease 
of use is also associated with the intensity of the network usage. Using a difficult-to-use 
system a warfighter may fall into learning the system instead of planning and conducting a 
military operation. Ease of use also covers the plug-and-play features of a network device that 
can speed up and facilitate network configuration and maintenance on the battlefield. 
2.4. Design Goals and Security Dimensions 
The purpose of security is to protect an information environment in all forms [39]. In a 
military context, information exposition may have greater consequences than information of 
other (e.g. civilian) areas. In a military environment, lives can be lost on a large scale or the 
balance of power can be shifted significantly. Protected information includes e.g. operations 
orders, war plans, troop movements, technical specifications for weapons or intelligence 
collection systems, identities of undercover intelligence agents, and any number of other 
items critical to the functioning of military and government. 
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In the military environment, a system wide, overall network architecture is required because 
the various systems, coupled with the large number of units and other stakeholders, make it 
difficult at times to maintain a holistic view (“big picture”) while working separately [37]. 
During last decades, lack of an overall architecture has led to system solutions that are limited 
in scope, sub optimized, and not interoperable within and across military and governmental 
organizations and services. Similarly, lack of overall security architectures has caused 
challenges and problems of vulnerable, complex, poorly managed, and non-interoperable 
solutions. Military networking systems should be designed and implemented so that they 
provide battlefield networks that are highly automated, adaptive, interoperable, secure, and 
resilient to all types of attacks. These military networks should achieve the following goals 
[37]: 
- Graceful degradation. Battlefield networks should be developed with a degree of fault 
tolerance along with the capability to degrade gracefully. The creation of critical nodes 
should be minimized, and move toward distributed systems. A certain level of 
redundancy should be built into these networks, also with all security services. 
- Robustness. A natural first phase in reducing cyber vulnerabilities within a system is 
to enhance overall quality of software and devices. Identifying and preventing to use 
those products that include easily exploitable vulnerabilities will surely reduce the 
number of attacks. Automated tools to detect and mitigate malicious codes should be 
developed. 
- Rapid reconstitution. Physical attacks can and often do target multiple sites which 
means that one backup location may be insufficient. Although diversity has benefits, 
recovery may be easier and faster with homogeneous, readily available systems. These 
two attributes must be addressed carefully. Another critical element that affects the 
ability to reconstruct destroyed systems is system experts with unique knowledge or 
experience, especially with respect to integration issues.  
- Security up front. Many security vulnerabilities in both hardware and software result 
from inadequate consideration of security during the design process. Information 
technology companies must be encouraged to carry out security training for designers 
and software developers and improve their efforts to build in security up front. 
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The most common security concept presented in many references is known as the CIA triad 
[30], [41], [44], [84]. The security dimensions included in the CIA triad are confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. However, Whitman and Mattord [103] present four other measures 
which are accuracy, authenticity, possession and utility. These seven measures are listed in 
Table 2 which shows the purpose, threats and protection methods of each measure. The ITU-
T X.805 [85] standard describes eight security dimensions that include some of those 
presented in Table 2, but the standard also introduces a few new dimensions. The ITU-T 
dimensions are access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, 
communication security, data integrity, availability, and privacy. 
The security dimensions mean the precautionary measures taken toward possible danger or 
damage to information. The value of information comes from the features (equals to security 
dimension) it has. When a feature of information changes, the value of that information either 
increases, or, more commonly, decreases. Some characteristics affect the value of information 
to users more than others do. This can depend on circumstances; for example, timeliness of 
information can be a critical factor, because information loses much or all of its value when it 
is delivered too late. [37] 
The secure dimensions provide information protection requirements for military information 
services and networks. It is difficult to prioritize the dimensions but information 
confidentiality plays a critical role in military operations. Classified information is protected 
by all means to keep operational intentions secret. Integrity is important when a message 
carries time critical, sensitive information such as firing or attacking orders. A level of 
required information availability may vary during the operation in according to needed 
services and information.  
Also, some balancing between the dimensions may be required [37]. It is possible to make a 
system with complete availability (available to anyone, anywhere, anytime, through any 
means). However, such unrestricted access poses a high danger and threat to the security of 
the information. On the other hand, a totally secure information system would not allow 
anyone access to information or services. To gain balance, in which an information system 
satisfies both the user and the security professional, the security level must allow reasonable 
access, and at the same time, protect against the most likely threats. 
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Table 2: The security dimensions. 
 
From a networking point of view, availability means that end users are able to reach necessary 
databases and services during a mission. Availability should be guaranteed in all situations 
and circumstances. On the tactical level, this means that wireless links are establishes 
securely, and access control does not limit user access when network topologies are changing. 
Data accuracy and authenticity requirements are also challenging in tactical networks. Errors 
in data may occur due to a continuously changing network configuration. A mechanism 
should be implemented that guarantees a data packet arrives with no errors and modifications 
although the network topology was changed during transmit. 
Confidentiality is typically provided by using encryption so that captured packets could not be 
opened by an adversary. Use of encryption is very critical in wireless communication systems, 
because an enemy can easily listen and record radio signals. Integrity requirements mean that 
data packets are not modified by an authorized user during transportation. Security functions 
should provide mechanisms that verify packets to include the original content. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
In the Network Centric Warfare paradigm, the most important factor is the networking people, 
processes, information sources, and information. Although the main focus of NCW is not on 
technologies and technical networking, data communications system play a very important 
role as an information sharing enabler. An effective and comprehensive communication 
system allows fast, safe and timely information sharing between the network centric actors. 
Without the communications network systems the benefit of the C2 data processing systems 
may turn out to be minimal. A challenge is to link together the NCW actors reliably and 
safely, and to develop the processes and procedures of these actors to support the network 
centric processes. Main challenges with communications are system interoperability, 
communication security, information sharing policies and network management.  
The tactical communication environment differs a lot from the strategic or operative level 
environments. From a networking point of view, the tactical environment is very dynamic 
compared to the higher level environments. In those static environments, connections are 
typically based on fixed optical fibers providing the communication speed of gigabytes per 
second. The networks are reconfigured using manual processes preceded by often lengthy 
negotiations and contracting. 
At the tactical level, the rapid changes of the service requirements cause demands for the 
communication network's ability to adapt quickly. Thus, communication is mostly based on 
combat net radios to provide a reliable and rapid deployable communication infrastructure. 
However, the transmission speed of the combat net radios is very limited providing 
connections up to only hundreds of kbps. Movement of troops changes the topology of the 
network continuously. This sets high demands to network operators to reconfigure routing, 
security functions, frequency allocation, etc. Terrain obstacles and long distances between 
network nodes cause connectivity failings. The nodes must be operational during connection 
breaks by having all information required to conduct operations. 
Security challenges concern electronic and cyber warfare. With electronic warfare capabilities 
the enemy is able to listen to and record radio signals generated by friendly forces. Thus, 
wireless tactical systems must have mechanisms to protect data packets that are to be 
transmitted in the air.  Another threat is a node capture in which the enemy is able to take over 
a whole network node. The node should have security features that prevent the enemy to 
access classified data inside the node, and the features that inform the network operator about 
the capture. The security controls built in the node should consider all the security 
dimensions. 
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The design goals (robustness, graceful degradation, rapid reconstitution, and security) are 
challenging to achieve. At the same time, the network should be distributed and centralized. 
The network should be functional in all conditions even if it is broken into separated network 
segments. Services should be built so that they are distributed, but still under centralized 
control. 
Implementing new capabilities and features increases the system complexity which grows the 
importance of network management. Human network operators are good in perceiving 
situation, but the status of a complex system could be impossible to recognize completely. 
Thus, automation and artificial intelligence should be used to take care of the management 
processes that require lots of computational capacity. 
Today’s security features and performance requirements are not trivial to implement in the 
tactical networks. New security or communication protocols increase the overhead of data 
packets which cause troubles in the already narrow wireless channels. The protocols decrease 
the payload throughput. New security protocols should be light-weight and rather built-in to 
the other protocols. 
All the requirements and limitations described previously must be considered when designing 
the cyber security architecture for the tactical military networks is started. The architecture 
should include the features of 1) distributed security controls 2) centralized management 3)  
dynamic system configuration and 4) resource-efficient functionalities.  
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3. CYBER SECURITY THREATS TO MILITARY NETWORKING 
Cyber security threats and requirements are both extremely growing higher in societies 
around the world. Daily life is based on networked computers that offer a new way to do 
business, maintain social relationships or just share information. This high-dependence in the 
networks and information systems creates new opportunities also for criminals and other 
hostile parties. Every piece of infrastructure including a programmable microcircuit can be a 
potential target of a cyber attack. Thus, it is vital to consider cyber threats in a very detailed 
way when building a hardware or software. This chapter discusses on cyberspace as a new 
domain, cyber warfare, and threat and exploitation methods. The main purpose of the chapter 
is to define the threat scenarios for military networks. The chapter also presents the main 
problems and challenges in legacy military networks. 
3.1. Cyberspace 
Cyberspace is a key feature of modern life. Individuals, communities and even militaries 
connect, socialize, and organize themselves in and through cyberspace. From 2000 to 2010, 
global Internet usage increased from 360 million to over 2 billion people [28]. As Internet 
usage and networking keeps expanding, cyberspace will become the domain in which 
everyday life is depending across the globe.  
A key character of cyberspace is the speed of events. In cyberspace, businesses trade goods 
and services by moving assets across the globe in seconds. In addition to facilitating trade in 
other sectors, cyberspace is itself a key sector of the global economy. Cyberspace has become 
an incubator for new forms of business, advances in technology, the spread of free speech, 
and new social networks. The security and effective operation of critical infrastructure 
including energy, banking and finance, transportation, communication, and defense rely on 
cyberspace of industrial control systems, and information technology that are vulnerable to 
disruption or cyber exploitation. [28] 
It is a fact that cyberspace is full of vulnerabilities. The continuing growth of networked 
systems, devices, and platforms means that cyberspace is embedded into an increasing 
number of capabilities for both defenders and attackers. Thus, it is natural that many nations 
are working to exploit cyberspace, and some foreign intelligence organizations have already 
acquired the capacity to disrupt elements of information infrastructures. Moreover, non-state 
actors increasingly threaten to penetrate and disrupt networks and systems around the world. 
It is recognized that malicious activities that are not yet even detected may occur on networks 
and systems. [28] 
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The US National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [90] defines cyberspace as the 
domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, 
modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. 
The United States Department of Defense describes cyberspace as a global domain within the 
information environment. It consists of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers. Within cyberspace, electronics, and the electromagnetic 
spectrum are used to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems. Cyberspace 
operations employ cyberspace capabilities primarily to achieve objectives in or through 
cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate 
and defend the Global Information Grid. [10] 
United Nations (UN) states cyberspace as “the global system of systems of Internetted 
computers, communications infrastructures, online conferencing entities, databases and 
information utilities generally known as the Net.” This mostly means the Internet, but the 
term may also be used to refer to the specific, bounded electronic information environment of 
a corporation or of a military, government, or other organization. [101] 
In a context of military operations, cyberspace is seen as one of five warfighting domains. The 
others are air, land, maritime, and space. The domains are interdependent, and cyberspace 
nodes physically exist in all the domains. Activities in cyberspace can enable freedom of 
action for war fighting activities in the other domains, and activities in the other domains can 
also create significant effects in and through cyberspace. Cyberspace can be viewed as three 
layers that are physical, logical, and social. At the same time, cyberspace is built of five 
components (geographic, physical network, logical network, cyber persona, and persona) 
[93]. The structure of cyberspace is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: The structure of cyberspace (three layers, five components).[93]  
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The physical layer consists of the geographic component and the physical network 
component. The geographic component is the physical location of elements of the network. 
While geopolitical borders can easily be crossed in cyberspace at a rate about the speed of 
light, a physical aspect still ties cyberspace to the other domains. The physical network 
component contains all the hardware and infrastructure that supports the network and the 
physical connectors (e.g. cables). [93] 
The logical layer includes the logical network component that consists of the logical 
connections that exist between network nodes. It is which technical in nature. Network nodes 
are devices connected to a computer network. Nodes can be computers, servers, routers, 
personal digital assistants, cell phones, or various other network appliances. [93] 
The social layer contains the human and cognitive aspects and includes the cyber persona 
component and the persona component. The cyber persona component includes a person’s 
identification or persona on the network (e-mail address, computer IP address, cell phone 
number, and others). The persona component includes the people actually on the network. A 
single person can have multiple cyber personas (e.g. different e-mail accounts on different 
computers) and a single cyber persona can have multiple users (e.g. multiple users accessing a 
single service account). This holds important implications for military forces in terms of 
attributing responsibility and targeting the source of cyber action. This also means that 
military forces need significant situational awareness, forensic, and intelligence capabilities to 
counter the complex cyber threat. [93] 
Table 3 lists the major characteristics of cyberspace. The three first characteristics of 
cyberspace consider cyberspace from a human action perspective [53]. People use cyberspace 
for social interaction, search information and virtually manage and conduct their daily 
routines such as shopping, finance and reading newspapers. The last three characteristics are 
more related to the technical features of cyberspace. As it is known, events occur very fast in 
cyberspace. In theory, the maximum speed of data is limited to the speed of light (at least in 
near future). Thus, in practice, communication and interaction takes place in real time. The 
global Internet has no spatial boundaries. A global routing system guarantees that everyone 
has access to all places in the world (to where the Internet reaches). Cyberspace is a space in 
which we have no “distances” between actors. All the actors are the same distance away. 
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Cyberspace is a very complex environment. There were over 2.2 billion Internet users in 2011 
[80]. Several Internet users have more than one device to connect the Internet which makes 
the number of devices very high. To provide Internet access, network operators around the 
world need to have global communication infrastructures.  The end result is a huge complex 
ecosystem, serving billions of people 24 hours every day. 
Table 3: Characteristics of cyberspace. 
Characteristic Description 
Virtuality A person can make electronic personality. People can take part in 
activities on cyberspace. 
Interaction People share their ideas and information for business or private. 
Social interactions include chatting, online gaming, and social 
media. 
Information source Internet resources are open to everyone. Everyone can also be 
an information creator. 
Speed of events Events and transactions occur at almost the speed of light which 
makes cyberspace different from the physical space. 
No spatial boundaries The global network is not limited by spatial boundaries such as 
national borders. Everyone has mainly access to all other 
addresses on Internet. 
Complexity The ecosystem of cyberspace is very complex to perceive and 
understand completely. Monitoring and management of 
cyberspace is challenging. 
 
3.2. Cyber Warfare 
Cyber warfare is unlike traditional warfare, but it shares some characteristics with the 
historical role of aerial bombardment, submarine warfare, special operations forces, and even 
assassins. Specifically, it can inflict painful, asymmetric damage on an adversary from a 
distance or by exploiting the element of surprise.[39] The term warfare is strongly connected 
to the military perspective. However, it could be benefit to expand the perspective, because 
commercial and civilian communications systems are connected to the same battlefield on 
which the nation states are fighting [10].  
Cyber warfare is also defined as actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's 
computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption [16]. Cyber warfare 
refers to politically motivated hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage. It is a form of 
information warfare sometimes seen as analogous to conventional warfare although this 
analogy is controversial for both its accuracy and its political motivation. A challenge is that 
no legal entity known as cyber war exists. The only issue that has been well-defined by 
international agreement is a nation’s right to self-defense when attacked, and that applies only 
to the traditional manner of attack, i.e., “armed” attack. [16] 
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Figure 8 illustrates how cyber warfare is related to cyber network operations, cyber situational 
awareness and cyber support activities [93]. Cyber Situational Awareness (CyberSA) is the 
instant knowledge of friendly, enemy and other relevant information regarding activities in 
cyberspace. Awareness gained by combining intelligence and operational activities in 
cyberspace and in the other domains. CyberSA enables informed decision-making at all levels 
via flexibly tailored products and processes that range from general bulletins to extremely 
sensitive and classified tools and services. CyberSA enables and derives from Cyber Network 
Operations, Cyber Warfare, and Cyber Support as depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Cyber warfare related to the other components of cyber operations [93]. 
Cyber Network Operations (CyNetOps) is the component that establishes, operates, manages, 
protects, defends, and commands and controls networks, critical infrastructure and key 
resources. CyNetOps consists of enterprise management, cyber content management, and 
cyber defense, including information assurance, computer network defense with response 
actions, and critical infrastructure protection. CyNetOps supports Cyber Warfare by providing 
information for offensive operations. [93] 
Cyber Warfare (CyberWar) is the component that extends cyber power beyond the defensive 
boundaries of the operational networks to detect, deter, deny, and defeat enemies. CyberWar 
capabilities are used against computers, communication networks, embedded processors and 
microcircuits in equipment, systems and infrastructure. CyberWar is conducted through cyber 
exploitation, cyber attacks, and dynamic cyber defense which combines highly automated 
processes (sensors, intelligence analysis, etc.) to identify and analyze malicious activity, 
simultaneously executing response actions to defeat attacks before they can affect. [93] 
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Cyber Support (CyberSpt) is a varied collection of supporting activities which are created to 
specifically enable both network operations and cyber warfare. These activities are called-out 
in this unifying category due to their unique and expensive nature as high-skilled, low-
density, time-sensitive/intensive activities requiring specialized training and processes. 
Additionally, some of these activities also require specialized coordination, synchronization, 
and integration to address legal and operational considerations. CyberSpt activities are carried 
out by multiple stakeholders. Examples of support activities contain vulnerability assessment, 
threat-based security assessment, reverse engineering and law enforcement-based cyber 
forensics. [93] 
Enabling Cyber Operations Capabilities include activities that enable cyber operations in 
certain conditions. An example of this is electronic warfare (EW) that must be deconflicting, 
fully coordinated, and synchronized with CyberOps. Enablers improve the effectiveness and 
integration of military capabilities and their consequent effects. Enabling ways improve the 
effectiveness and integration of cyber operations capabilities. Cyber operations require 
continuous actions taken to form the operational environment and set the conditions to be 
successful to operations. Law and policy set limitations on what can be conducted 
operationally and feed the development of rules of engagement (ROE). [93] 
3.3. Cyber Threats and Exploits 
Threat is a function of an enemy’s motivation, their capabilities, the opportunity, and the 
impact that a successful attack on a target [12]. Motivation is considered to be identification 
of both the reason why somebody would start attacking and a measure of the degree to which 
the attack would be conducted to the end. Table 4 categorizes potential attackers by their 
motivation. The attackers can be divided into five groups that are criminals, hackers, nations, 
terrorists and activists. The table shows the more detailed description of the motivations and 
activities of each group. 
Capability is defined as power to do something [12]. In terms of cyber warfare the term 
capability is used as a measure of the availability of different tools and techniques to conduct 
an attack and the ability to use the tools and techniques correctly. Capability also includes the 
availability of training and education to support the efficient use of the tools and weapons. In 
other words, capability can be seen as the degree to which the attacker is able to implement a 
threat. 
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Opportunity is defined as a favorable occasion for action. An attacker must have correct 
conditions before attacking. The target must be in a vulnerable condition so that the 
adversary’s capabilities are effective and have correct impact on the target. The term impact is 
used to represent the concept of effect that an attack can gain against a target system. The 
measurement of the attack can be made in direct or indirect terms.  
Table 4: Potential attackers and their motivations. [25] 
Attacker Motivations/Activities 
Criminals Criminal groups seek to attack systems for monetary benefit. Typically, 
organized criminals use spam, phishing, and malware to conduct identity theft, 
online fraud, and computer extortion. 
Hackers Pure hackers break into network systems for the thrill of the challenge and 
bragging rights in the hacker community.  Decades ago, unauthorized access 
required a fair amount of skill or computer knowledge, but today hackers can 
use several advanced attack scripts and protocols. 
Nations 
 
Nations use cyber weapons alongside with conventional weapons. Several 
nations are working to develop cyber warfare strategies, doctrine, and 
capabilities. Cyber capabilities enable a single entity to have a significant and 
serious impact by disrupting the supply, communications, and economic 
infrastructures around the globe.  
Terrorists 
 
Terrorists want to destroy, damage, or exploit critical infrastructures in order to 
threaten national security, cause casualties, affect the economy, and damage 
public morale and confidence. Terrorists use different schemes to achieve 
monetary gain, to gather sensitive information or to damage critical 
infrastructure. 
Activists Cyber activist use cyberspace to achieve their political objectives. Activists use 
several activities to affect political decision-makers. These activities vary from 
information publication to large scale denial-of-service attacks. 
 
Cyber based threats are evolving and growing and arise from a wide array of sources. These 
threats can be unintentional or intentional. Unintentional threats can be caused by software 
upgrades or defective equipment that inadvertently disrupt systems. Intentional threats include 
both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, 
hackers, disgruntled employees, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information 
warfare, and terrorists. These threat sources vary in terms of the capabilities of the actors, 
their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include monetary gain or political 
advantage, among others. [25] 
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According to the desired effect, cyber attacks can be categorized into three basic forms from 
which all others derive [39]. Confidentiality attacks comprise any unauthorized acquisition of 
information, including undisclosed information analysis in which an attacker gathers traffic 
content. Because global network connectivity comes a way before network security, hackers 
can easily steal huge amounts of information. Integrity attacks include the unauthorized 
modification of information. Attacks can contain the disruption of data for criminal, political, 
or military purposes. Confidentiality and integrity attacks are penetration attacks that involve 
breaking into a system using known security vulnerabilities to gain access to target resources. 
The goal of availability attacks is to prevent authorized users from accessing into the systems 
or data that is required to conduct operations. Attacks are commonly described as a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack and cover a wide range of malware, network traffic, or physical attacks 
on computers, databases and the networks that connect them. The purpose is to affect the 
system through diminishing the system’s ability to function. 
A large variety of cyber exploitation and attacking techniques and methods are found in 
literature, and thus it is not possible to explain all of them in the scope of this research. In 
Table 5, the most common attack types and exploits are described. The purpose of the table is 
not to give the complete list of attacking methods, but rather show how complex and 
multidimensional the cyber threat is. One must also remember that different methods can be 
used together, and the boundaries between the attack and exploit types are not always very 
tight and well-described. 
It is obvious that security threats and attacks may involve any layer, from physical to the 
application. It is possible that a successful attack in one layer may appear useless against the 
security measures in the other layers [30]. On the other hand, some advanced attacks utilize 
vulnerabilities from many layers and protocols, and thus make the attack difficult to detect 
and protect by legacy devices (firewalls, IDSs, IPSs, etc.). A good example of these advanced 
hacking methods exploiting combination of different vulnerabilities and weaknesses is 
advanced evasion techniques (AETs) [64]. 
Evasion techniques are a means to disguise cyber attacks in order to avoid detection and 
blocking by information security systems. Evasions enable cyber criminals to deliver 
malicious content to a vulnerable system without detection that would normally stop the 
threat. Network security systems are ineffective against evasion techniques in the same way a 
stealth fighter can attack without detection by radar or other similar defensive systems. [64] 
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Table 5: Types of cyber exploits and attacks [25], [41], [103]. 
Exploit/attack Description 
Malicious 
code 
The malicious code attack includes the execution of viruses, worms, Trojan horses, 
and active web scripts with the intent to destroy or steal information. The state-of-the-
art malicious code attack is the polymorphic or multivector worm. 
Hoaxes A more devious attack on computer systems is the transmission of a virus hoax with a 
real virus attached. When the attack is masked in a seemingly legitimate message, 
unsuspecting users more readily distribute it. 
Backdoors Using a known or previously unknown and newly discovered access mechanism, an 
enemy can gain access to a system or network resource through a backdoor. 
Sometimes these entries are left behind by system designers or maintenance staff. 
Password 
crack 
Attempting to reverse-calculate a password. A cracking attack is a component of many 
dictionary attacks (to be covered shortly). 
Brute force  
and 
dictionary 
attack 
The application of computing and network resources to try every possible password 
combination. The dictionary attack is a variation of the brute force attack which 
narrows the field by selecting specific target accounts and using a list of commonly 
used passwords (the dictionary) instead of random word combinations. 
Denial-of-
service 
An attack that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems, or 
applications by exhausting resources. 
Distributed 
denial-of-
service 
A variant of the denial-of-service attack that uses numerous hosts to perform the 
attack. 
Spoofing Spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, wherein the 
intruder sends messages with a source IP address that has been forged to indicate 
that the messages are coming from a trusted host. 
Man-in-the-
middle 
In the well-known man-in-the-middle or TCP hijacking attack, an attacker monitors (or 
sniffs) packets from the network, modifies them, and inserts them back into the 
network. 
Spam Spam is unsolicited commercial e-mail. While many consider spam a trivial nuisance 
rather than an attack, it has been used as a means of enhancing malicious code 
attacks. 
Mail bombing Another form of e-mail attack (also a DoS) is called a mail bomb, in which an attacker 
routes large quantities of e-mail to the target. 
Sniffers A sniffer is a program or device that can monitor data traveling over a network. 
Sniffers can be used both for legitimate network management functions and for 
stealing information. 
Cross-site 
scripting 
 
An attack that uses third-party web resources to run script within the victim’s web 
browser or scriptable application. This occurs when a browser visits a malicious 
website or clicks a malicious link. 
Logic bombs 
 
A piece of programming code intentionally inserted into a software system that will 
cause a malicious function to occur when one or more specified conditions are met. 
Phishing 
 
A digital form of social engineering that uses authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails to 
request information from users or direct them to a fake website that requests 
information. 
Passive 
wiretapping 
The monitoring or recording of data while they are being transmitted over a 
communications link. Wiretapping is done without altering or affecting the data. 
Social 
Engineering 
The target of Social engineering is  to attack the human element of a system to gain 
sensitive information or access to target systems. 
Pharming In Pharming, traffic is directed to an illegitimate site for the purpose of obtaining private 
information. Pharming often uses virus technologies to attack the Internet browser’s 
address bar so that the valid URL typed by the user is modified to that of the 
illegitimate web site. 
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Advanced evasion techniques can be identified according to certain underlying principles: 
 Delivered in a highly liberal way 
 Security devices are designed in a conservative way 
 Use of rarely used protocol properties 
 Use of unusual combinations 
 Craft network traffic that disregards strict protocol specifications 
 Exploit the technical and inspection limitations of security devices: memory capacity, 
performance optimization, design flaws, etc.[64] 
3.4. Threat Scenarios for Military Networks 
In many cases, threat scenarios in the military environment vary from those concerning the 
civilian or commercial networking environment. In the military environment, a hostile 
adversary attempts to affect information and network infrastructures to prevent the normal use 
of information services. The enemy may use electronic warfare capabilities, physical effects, 
or cyber weapons to disturb network and service availability or steal and modify critical 
information.  
The threat scenarios to military information systems can be examined in the following four 
areas [37]: 
 Physical attacks on critical information and networking nodes 
 Electromagnetic attacks against information assets 
 Cyber attacks against information systems 
 Attacks and system failures made possible by the increased level of complexity 
inherent in the variety of advanced systems. 
      36 
Physical attacks and effects are still seen as important means of attack to affect the 
information processing and sharing of the opponent’s force. Physical (kinetic) attacks can use 
low technology but still be highly effective. Critical network nodes, satellite ground stations, 
server centers, and other dedicated military and commercial infrastructure can be attacked 
directly with high explosives or other physical means to disrupt information processing and 
sharing, and thus, entire military operations. Also, if enemy forces capture one of the many 
computers in the future battlefield, and possibly along with the legitimate user, the adversary 
may be able to access the battlefield networks and C2 systems, and use the captured node to 
disrupt operations by cyber attacking. 
Electromagnetic threats cover a wide range of possible weapons that includes the means of 
directed energy such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and electronic warfare. EMP weapons 
can destroy or injure electronic systems without physical attack or explosives. Electronic 
warfare (EW) systems utilize the electromagnetic spectrum, and they can be used to deny the 
use of sensors and radio frequency communications. Typical EW means include jamming, 
and signal intelligence and positioning. 
Cyber attacks are attractive because they can be launched from remote locations, offering the 
hostile attackers a degree of anonymity and safety. Advanced attackers can hide their tracks 
and make it challenging to identify not only who the attacker is but also from where the attack 
was launched. 
The quantity and sophistication of the information technology introduced will increase 
significantly the level of complexity. From a technical point, as the complexity increases, the 
networks become less reliable and less predictable. Systems that are appropriately complex 
can allow unexpected interactions of failures. If the information systems are tightly coupled, 
they can permit failures to cascade, sometimes enough to bring down the entire system. This 
chain of unexpected events can be started by hardware failure, natural hazards, or, in the case 
of military operations, a cyber attack on the system.  
From a cyber security architecture point of view, the area of cyber attacks is the most 
interesting, and the main purpose of the security architecture is to provide necessary security 
controls to protect against cyber attacks. However, the other areas must be also considered 
because they may have indirect effects to the architecture. For example, the threat of node 
capture sets requirements to security controls to prevent the misuse of a captured node.  
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In this study, the cyber threat scenarios on communication networks can are considered by 
analyzing the objectives of a cyber attack and the ultimate outcome the attack may have. The 
objectives are in line with those attack categories presented in the previous chapter. The 
effects of cyber attack align generally into four threat scenarios based on the attacker’s 
ultimate purpose [24]: 
1. Integrity Violation. Data integrity is a basic security requirement for end users, but it 
is also very critical for military operations. If the loss of data integrity is not corrected, 
continued use of the corrupted data could result in inaccuracy, fraud, or incorrect 
decision-making or operation of information systems and networks. 
2. Prevention of Availability. If a mission-critical network is attacked and all services are 
made unavailable to its end users, the mission or operation will most likely be 
affected. Loss of system functionality and operational effectiveness may result in loss 
of productive time, or military decision-making. 
3. Confidentiality Violation. Successful military operations require high information 
confidentiality. Information services and networks should provide appropriate 
confidentiality services so that operational data is kept secret as desired. 
Communication channels, data processes and databases must be secured against 
untrusted parties.  
4. Physical Destruction. Physical destruction is conducted by using cyber weapons or 
traditional explosives.  Physical destruction requires positioning of target systems. 
Cyber weapons can be use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
that control for example airspace, water systems or power plants. 
In each threat scenario, several exploits and attack techniques are utilized depending on 
available tools, a structure of the target system, and overall operational design. The exploits 
may be used in different phases of a cyber attack process. Typically, a cyber attack consists of 
five main phases [49]; reconnaissance, penetration, privilege escalation, malicious activity, 
and covering trails. The phases are illustrated in Table 6 that presents the attack phase for 
each scenario. It is remarkable that all the five phases may not exist in all the threat scenarios. 
The first phase of an attack is reconnaissance of the target system. By observing the normal 
operations of a target, useful information can be discovered and collected. This information 
includes such as installed hardware and software, regular and periodic communications 
traffic, and the formatting of communications. 
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The second phase is penetration. To achieve a desired effects the attacker must be able to 
enter into the target system. However, penetration is not required when the purpose is to 
disrupt the availability or access to a given service provided by the target. During the third 
phase, the attacker identifies and expands the internal capabilities by viewing resources and 
increasing access rights to more restricted and critical areas of the target system. 
Table 6: The main phases of a cyber attack. 
 
The fourth phase includes the actions by which the attacker’s cyber weapon damages the 
target system, or steals or modifies selected data and/or information. In the last phase, the 
attacker removes all the evidences of the penetration, theft, and modifications. The attacker 
electronic trail can be covered by editing or deleting log files and other data files including 
user or access information. 
During an attack, the attacker wants to complete all these five phases successfully. However, 
the conducted phases are dependent on the type of attack method utilized, the desired goal, 
and the target’s individual defensive capabilities. For example, armed forces may not have 
any reasons to hide trails in war time operations when both parties are heavily involved with 
full war fighting. 
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Table 7 depicts cyber attack threats included in different phases of each threat scenario. The 
attacker may exploit several vulnerabilities and attack tools to achieve the desired end state. 
The table shows the typical threats that are relevant for each scenario concerning military 
communications especially on a tactical level where a high risk of a node falling into enemy 
hands is present. On the other hand, wireless connections that are widely used in the tactical 
environment are facilitating the adversary to collect information from radio signals. We 
should notice that Table 7 is not a complete list of all cyber threats against tactical networks. 
Cyber threats may rapidly change over time, and new attack techniques and tools are to be 
developed all the time. The purpose of the table is to determine a threat scenario reference that 
could be used for the evaluation of the cyber security architecture (see Chapter 6). 
3.5. Security Challenges with Legacy Military Networks 
This section examines the implementation of current military ICT systems and technical 
challenges and problems in a changing threat environment. The oldest military C2 systems 
still in use were built up in the 80's when the security threats were totally different. Typically, 
the military communication networks were isolated example from the networks of 
commercial operators. The systems were simple compared to today’s technologies and 
implementations, and the networks and services were often built for a single functionality or 
service. A security level of information defined the level of implementation. The security 
protection in the systems was largely based on physical protection, because the military 
information systems and networks were not connected to other networks and systems. Thus, 
the main threat was a hostile actor who could import a malicious code to this closed system 
causing interference or break-outs in a target system. 
The aim of this section is not to describe all the possible problems and challenges of existing 
military communication systems, but rather focus on the four entities which the author 
believes the most weaken the current security level of the legacy military communication 
systems. The entities to be reviewed are static configuration, lack of light-weight security 
protocols, centralized security services and overall security management. 
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Table 7: Cyber threats for the threat scenarios of military networking. 
Threat Scenario Threat Description 
Integrity Violation Control 
message 
alteration 
An attacker intercepts control messages in the middle of 
communication entities and alters certain information to 
reroute traffic or change control information. 
End-user data 
alteration 
An attacker manipulates an end-user’s data packets or files. 
Unauthorized modification, deletion, creation, and replication 
of end-user data. 
Configuration 
alteration 
An attacker alters information in network configuration files. 
Node capture An attacker captures a network node and uses it for violating 
information content or system processes. 
Routing violation An attacker modifies routing information packets and thus 
prevents a node to reach correct destinations. 
Prevention of 
Availability 
Flooding An attacker generates a huge traffic load that prevents 
authorized users to access services. 
Node capture An attacker captures a network node preventing end-users to 
access services. 
Malformed 
control 
messages 
An attacker injects malformed control messages that cause 
the loss of service availability. 
Connection 
hijacking 
An attacker hijacks a communication connection and 
prevents an authorized user to access services. 
Quality-of- 
Service abuse 
An attacker modifies QoS control messages providing the 
degradation of service level. 
Server 
impersonating 
An attacker captures an information server, and closes 
services. 
Confidentiality  
Violation 
Node capture An attacker captures a network node disclosing end-users or 
network control data. 
Exploitation of 
software 
vulnerabilities 
An attacker exploits known or unknown software or hardware 
vulnerabilities to discovering unauthorized data. 
Masqueraders An attacker uses stolen access information for authorized 
access. 
Unauthorized 
user activity 
An attacker manages to access unauthorized data because 
of poor protection. 
Unprotected 
network access 
An attacker uses unprotected access points to entering the 
network and data. 
Unprotected 
data links 
An attacker taps to an unprotected data link.  
Eavesdropping 
end-user data 
An attacker is able to eavesdrop the transferred end-user 
data. 
Traffic tracking An attacker captures network traffic, and is able to locate 
communication nodes and to examine e.g. network topology. 
Eavesdropping 
control 
messages 
An attacker captures control messages, and is able to 
examine used communication and security protocols. 
Physical 
Destruction 
Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical network 
service 
An attacker uses kinetic force to destroy a node that is 
critical for network services (e.g. routing), leading to loss of 
data transport. 
Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical network 
node 
An attacker uses kinetic force to destroy a node that is 
critical for data transport between a server and client. 
Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical control 
node 
An attacker uses kinetic force to destroy a node that is 
critical for network control and management. 
Non-kinetic 
destruction 
An attacker uses non-kinetic weapons to destroy a network 
node. 
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Static Configuration 
Today, legacy military networks and information systems use static configurations to provide 
desired services to end users. Configuration files are once loaded into the systems, and no 
modifications are made until the service requirements have been changed enough. Thus the 
current day military network is static in nature, and it is not aware of its state at any point of 
time [97]. 
Reconfiguration is provided manually by a network operator. Traditionally, network service 
production and management involves complex labor intensive processes performed by these 
network operators. The systems are configured according to service level and security 
requirements. A problem is that especially the security requirements change continuously and 
often very rapidly. A cyber threat environment reshapes fast due to the discovery of new 
vulnerabilities and the development of hacking techniques.  
Lack of Light-Weight Security Protocols 
All communication protocols create overhead to communication channels. Certain bits are 
required for the protocols, and thus they decrease the number of payload bits in each packet. 
Similarly, security services are not resource-free as security protocols consume valuable 
system resources including such as bandwidth, memory, processing power and battery power 
in mobile devices (e.g. tactical radios, soldier’s terminals). Thus, tactical-level devices cannot 
implement system programs with high computational requirements. Providing tactical 
military networks with appropriate security services must be resource efficient [2]. 
Several security protocols and algorithms have been discovered to solve the security issues of 
mobile wireless systems. Typically, security services are added on legacy military networks 
afterwards by implementing existing solutions to the wireless, tactical environment. The 
existing solutions are not designed for the tactical environment causing performance reduction 
[3]. 
A good example of a security protocol causing a significant overhead is the Internet Protocol 
Security (IPsec) suite for securing Internet Protocol (IP) communications by authenticating 
and/or encrypting each IP packet of a communication session. The IPsec encryption solution 
decreases a maximum throughput especially at smaller packet frame sizes. At 512-byte, 1024-
byte and 1280-byte frame sizes, approximately 100% the maximum theoretical throughput 
was achieved. However, at 256-byte frames, the performance was just 73 %, and at 128-byte 
frames it dropped down to 47%. Finally, at 64-byte frames the performance was 
approximately 27% of the maximum theoretical throughput. [99] 
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Centralized Security Services 
Many security services are today based on centralized service structures in which the security 
services are produced in a single location. In a case of fixed networks and locations, this may 
not be a problem as long as a user is able to be connected to these centralized services. The 
centralized service production has lots of benefits such as easier management, need for less 
network operators, and the cost-effective maintenance of infrastructure. 
Most of the legacy military networks are still dependent on the centralized security services 
such as authentication and authorization. For example, in centralized networks, the network is 
governed by a trusted third party - a central entity providing security certificates which is 
trusted network wide [56]. The central certificate source is not relevant for the today’s tactical 
networks which are desired to operate autonomously, and therefore, to be equally responsible 
for different types of security functionality, such as user access, node admission, or 
revocation.  
The centralized security service structure weakens reliability of the network. By affecting a 
single server or database an attacker may prevent services to be accessed. Legacy systems 
include firewalls and IDS/IPS systems to filter traffic and prevent malicious data to reach the 
target service or application, but in a case of advanced DDoS the reconfiguration of system 
parameters and restoring service availability may take a moment [103]. 
Lack of Overall Security Management 
Security management of the military communication networks is both technical and 
administrative security process including security policies and controls. Security management 
also includes monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness of the security policies and controls. 
The most effective method to fulfill the security requirements is to create a risk assessment 
process involving the entire network from security policies to a single security component. 
Therefore, security management by itself remains very complex. [54] 
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With the legacy military networks the management process should cover all the layers and 
entities of the network. However, the reality is often different as the oldest tactical network 
systems were built decades ago without an overall sight to network security. Security 
management functions and processes have been implemented along with new network 
components and features without considering the overall security management in each 
updating phase. Different applications may have separated access-granting and restricting 
policies and methods. The criteria on which access decisions are based may vary vastly 
among different services or systems or even between different instances inside the same 
application [54]. 
Traffic Flow Confidentiality 
Traffic flow confidentiality is even more critical in tactical networks where communication 
links are wireless, and thus easy to eavesdrop. Traffic flow refers to the information that can 
be observed by looking at the traffic flow rather than the information content within the 
payload of the transferred packets. Traffic flow can expose that there is data communications, 
the volume of communications, and the traffic sources and destinations. Traffic flow can be 
protected by using encryption at the lowest layer of the OSI stack, and simultaneously 
padding data flow so that the link always seems to be fully utilized regardless of the actual 
traffic rate. [103] 
The legacy military networks lack of traffic flow confidentiality.  Various encryption schemes 
have been implemented, but they typically encrypt only a user payload, and in some cases 
also network control traffic. The legacy systems are not capable of generating bulk traffic to 
fill silent periods in traffic flows 
3.6. Conclusions 
Cyberspace is growing all the time. New devices and systems are connected to the Internet 
every day. Computers and microcomputers are installed in places that seemed to be utopia a 
few decades ago. People's daily life is increasingly dependent on the Internet; servers, 
computers, and networks that link all them together. Business actors, different organizations, 
governments and also defense forces rely increasingly on computer networks and services. It 
is difficult to conduct daily business without networked ICT services. 
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Cyberspace is easy to access and even operate. Access to cyberspace requires only a laptop 
with a wireless or wired Internet connection. In cyberspace, a person can be anonymous if 
necessary. An actor may have a number of cyber persona roles. Hiding attack trails is easy, 
and the trails often disappear before the origin of an attacker is reached. On the other hand, 
cyberspace is still very dependent on the physical world. Cyberspace does not exist without 
physical devices; computers, routers, optical fiber cables, wireless base stations and server 
with databases. 
Cyber warfare has become a new dimension for warfighting. In the past, the motivation of 
actors in cyberspace consists of pure mischief, political extortion and criminal monetary gain. 
Today, cyberspace is used as a battlespace for nations which develop furiously intelligence, 
monitoring, protection and offensive cyber capabilities. Cyber warfare must be considered 
carefully in the development of new military information systems and networks. 
From perspective of a cyber security architecture, the cyber threats are challenging. Current 
threat scenarios contain a number of methods to attack the target against the system. The 
target of an attacker varies which affects what vulnerabilities and tools are exploited and used 
during the attack. The threat is continuously changing at a high speed. Attackers are 
constantly seeking new vulnerabilities, which they are going to exploit at the right moment. A 
challenge with today’s ICT systems is that the more complex the systems become the more 
attack vectors and surfaces they offer to the attacker. A complex infrastructure is difficult to 
maintain updated and patched in real time. 
The task of the security dimensions is to describe the security requirements set for 
information. When developing a network security architecture these requirements must be 
taken account. The security dimensions concern information content, and thus military 
network capabilities should be design and implemented so that processed, transported and 
stored information is secured throughout the network in all conditions.  
Battlefield conditions cause high requirements for the performance of tactical networks. The 
communication network must be secure, but also reliable and recoverable at the same time, 
and it must provide the necessary services to warfighters in very difficult environmental 
conditions. Network nodes must be mobile offering secure C2 services in all situations. 
Besides of the rough conditions the hostile enemy is always present on the battlefield seeking 
to influence continuously on the opponent's communications network and its services. 
      45 
A security architecture design should respond to the threat in the best possible way. The 
architecture should be design to protect against the threat scenarios described above. The 
architecture should provide sufficient security functionalities and controls that could be 
dynamically controlled in order to adapt network configuration in different combat and threat 
situations. The architecture should allow the flexible modification of the security functions 
according to the changing threat scenarios. This requires constant updating of a threat library 
and software controlled security controls. 
Security services in legacy military networks are more or less implemented with the 
mainstream and commercial technologies which create challenges in security management 
and availability. Many of the security services are provided by centralized servers that do not 
support node mobility at the tactical level very well. The security protocols used in the 
systems are originally designed for fixed environments where network capacity is much 
higher than in tactical networking systems. Amount of a security protocol overhead is not 
very critical in broadband connections, but in low bandwidth tactical radio networks the issue 
becomes vital. The currently used military information systems are based on static 
configuration causing a network node or server to be a moving target for the enemy. 
Security management is lacking an overall view within the legacy systems. Security controls 
are managed and controlled separately generating for example a risk of unknown role 
combinations that may create new vulnerabilities in the system. Privacy issues are typically 
considered carefully in the legacy systems but traffic flow confidentiality is not at the 
satisfactory level. Due to the above-mentioned weaknesses, designing a new security 
architecture is very relevant. The new architecture allows the construction of security services 
and controls to an integral part of the military communication system. 
Impact of cyber threats on the security architecture can be summarized in four points. First, 
the architecture must support changing threat scenarios. As the threat model changes, security 
controls described in the architecture have to adapt to the prevailing environment. Secondly, 
the architecture must take into account the defense in depth because it is impossible to build 
one hundred percent secure and invulnerable systems. With a layered approach, system 
penetrations by the enemy can be confused and slowed down. By monitoring the different 
layers an intruder can be detected in time to start counter actions. Third, military 
communication networks must fulfill the requirements for information protection which vary 
according to classification and different levels of security. An end-user must be able to trust 
the network, also from a security point of view. 
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Fourth, the network cyber security related functionalities must be automated as much as 
possible. Rapidly changing threats require a network operator to reconfigure network 
parameters fast and continuously. A risk is that manually provided changes increase the 
number of configuration errors. On the other hand, a human operator may not notice the 
complete status of the network and current threats when the network is monitored with 
manual methods. Using automated security controls the security processes and functions of 
the network could be speeded up and improved in quality. However, it is good to remember 
that a human being still has a unique ability to understand the cause-and-effect relationships 
in complex situations and environments.  
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4. COGNITIVE NETWORKS  
In recent years, terms cognitive and smart are strongly related to computer networks and 
communication systems, but these terms are not often defined very accurately from a 
communication networks perspective. However, it is generally understood that the above 
terms describe the ability of technology to adapt to changes in the environment [95]. By a 
definition described by Thomas, DaSilva and MacKenzie [95], cognition refers to 
consciousness and its content as a whole. Consciousness is associated with the ability to 
observe and analyze the environment, think, reason and solve problems. 
This chapter introduces the cognitive networks, and presents the main features of these 
networks. The chapter also discusses the new security threats concerning the cognitive 
networks. The aim is to show how cognitive capabilities could improve military 
communications networks, especially from a security point of view. 
4.1. Cognitive Networks Overview 
The basic functions of the cognitive networks include observation, learning, decision-making, 
self-management, and automatic configuration [58]. Thomas et al [94], [97] describe 
cognitive networks as: 
”A cognitive network is a network with a cognitive process that can perceive current network 
conditions, and then plan, decide, and act on those conditions. The network can learn from 
these adaptations and use them to make future decisions, all while taking into account end-to-
end goals.” 
The cognitive aspect of this description is similar to those used to describe a cognitive radio 
and broadly includes many simple models of cognition and learning. Unlike cognitive radios, 
cognitive network do not restrict its scope in radio spectrum. CN tries to exactly perceive the 
current network situation and plan and decide to meet the end-to-end goals in an entire 
network aspect. CN learns through this adaptation and uses information of these previous 
actions in future decisions. As new aspects, the definition introduces the terms network and 
end-to-end goal. Without the network and end-to-end approach, the system may only perform 
as a cognitive device or network layer, but not as a cognitive network in a wide scale. 
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In the definition, end-to-end represents all the network elements involved in the transmission 
of a data flow. In military communications, this includes e.g. the tactical radios, radio relays, 
routers, switches, virtual connections, encryption devices, interfaces, or wireless waveforms. 
The end-to-end goal which is typically defined by a client-server type of service, gives a 
cognitive network its network-wide scope. This separates the scheme from other adaptation 
approaches, which usually have a scope of single element, layer or resource. 
4.2. Cognitive Process  
A cognitive process in the cognitive networks could be viewed as the commonly known 
OODA loop [13], in which the network observes, orients, decides and acts. Figure 9 shows 
the phases of the OODA loop in context of cognitive networking. The observation phase is 
critical because the effect of a cognitive network’s decisions on the network performance 
depends on how much network state information is available. If a cognitive network has 
knowledge of the entire network’s state, cognitive decisions should be more “correct” than 
those made in ignorance. For a large, heterogeneous system such as military tactical networks, 
it is unlikely that the cognitive network would know the total system state. It could be very 
high costly to communicate status information beyond those network elements requiring it, 
meaning CN will have to work with less than a complete picture of the network resource 
status. 
 
Figure 9: The OODA loop in context of cognitive networking. 
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The orientation phase also plays an important role in the cognitive process. In this phase all 
observed information and previous knowledge are added together and analyzed.  Filters and 
weighting are examples of methods used in the orientation phase. In the decision phase, the 
best decision for the required end-to-end data flow capability is made. Learning is an 
important part of the orientation phase, because it can prevent the recurrence of past mistakes 
in future decisions. 
Finally, a network adjustment is provided in the acting phase. The adjustment includes 
modifications and reconfiguration of cognitive network elements. The network elements are 
also allowed to act selfishly and independently (in the context of the entire network) to 
achieve local goals, but the local goals must be resulted from the end-to-end goal. The actions 
taken have straight effect to the observed environment or network state, thus a feedback loop 
is created in which past interactions with the environment guide current and future 
interactions. 
4.3.  Cognitive System Framework 
Figure 10 illustrates a cognitive system framework [97] which consists of three functional 
levels. The end-to-end level includes applications, users and resources which form the end-to-
end goals to be achieved at an appropriate service level. The cognitive level consists of three 
components: the specification language, cognition layer, and network status sensors. These 
components provide the actual intelligence of the cognitive level, and allow the level to 
interface with the configurable network elements and the users and applications on the end-to-
end level. 
 
Figure 10: A cognitive system framework. 
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For connecting the top level requirements to the cognitive level, an interface layer must exist. 
Information about the goal must not be globally known, but needs to be communicated 
between the source of the requirements and the local cognitive processes. Other requirements 
for the specification language include at least support for distributed or centralized operation 
including the sharing of data between multiple cognition layers. The specification language 
does not actually perform the cognitive process which is done by the cognition layer, but the 
language is required to translate application level requirements for the cognitive layer. 
The cognitive process of the network can be either centralized or distributed. In the military 
environment, the requirements for high-resilience mean that each node should be able to 
maintain a cognitive process, providing an argument against the centralized solution. The 
cognition layer contains the cognitive element of the framework. Typically, cognition is 
provided through various machine learning algorithms as neural networks, genetic algorithms, 
artificial intelligence, Kalman filters and learning automata algorithms [94]. The network 
status sensors provide feedback from the network to the cognition layer, and the sensors also 
allow the cognition layer to observe patterns, trends, and thresholds in the network for 
possible action. To be able to report a connection status the cognitive layer must have an 
ability to manage the sensor. The sensor layer is also capable to distribute their information to 
the entire network. 
The software adaptive network layer consists of the network application programming 
interface (API) and configurable network elements. The network API provides a generic 
interface to adjust network parameters according to actions decided by the cognitive layer. 
Another responsibility of the API is to notify the cognitive network of what the operating 
states of the network elements are. Many modifications to the network stack require that all 
the links and nodes are synchronized and operating in the same mode. The communication 
required to synchronize these states is the responsibility of the software adaptive platform and 
could be realized either in or out of channel. 
4.4. Characteristics of Cognitive Networks 
The basic assumption is that the cognitive network provides better end-to-end performance 
than traditional, non-cognitive communication networks. Cognitive processes improve 
network resource management, quality of service (QoS), security, access control, and many 
other network-determined objectives [96]. The performance of the cognitive networks is only 
limited by the adaptation ability of the network elements. An ideal cognitive network 
functions proactively rather than reactively so that adaptation takes place before actual 
problems appear. 
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Cognitive networks have three basic characteristics: situational awareness, learning and 
decision-making abilities, and fully controlled network parameters and settings [58]. Situation 
awareness is generated through network's ability to observe the environment and the state of 
the network, and thus to form “understanding” of external and internal conditions. For 
network optimization, it is important that the network nodes share their status information 
with other nodes. In cognitive radio networks, an important factor is the ability of sensing the 
electromagnetic spectrum in place or time to find free radio channels. Learning consists of a 
network's ability to learn from past events, and decision-making is the ability to make 
decisions based on situational awareness and learning. 
During the learning and decision-making process, network node behavior can range from 
purely selfish and individualist to social and unselfish. Although the selfless and social 
behavior may seem natural for the end to end requirements, the selfish behavior can 
sometimes be more effective while adapting the network [94]. Selfish behavior of the network 
may be reasonable, because in real world communication systems nodes are often not under a 
global management system. In addition, the selfish node requires less centralized 
coordination, thereby reducing control traffic overhead. Selfishness can be considered with 
Equation (1) [95], [96]. An action a of a network node is selfish when the utility ui for 
element i, as a result of this action, given that every other element plays the actions that 
element i believes them to, is no less than the current utility ui for element i. 
    (1)    (1) 
The belief in Equation (1) is important, since ignorance may make this vector different than 
the actual strategies the other elements are employing. The network shows the feature of 
selfishness when every network element plays a selfish strategy, meaning that all cognitive 
elements only select actions that continuously improve their individual objectives. 
An unselfish network attempts to meet the end-to-end requirements. An objective function, 
called cost (detonated C), quantifies the performance of a network in achieving the goals for a 
specific action vector. This function is determined from the objectives of the network and, 
unlike the utility function, is enhanced as it is decreased. 
An action is unselfish when an element sacrifices its utility to decrease the cost function. The 
network activity is unselfish, when the following are valid [96]: 
     (2) 
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The network can be said to function unselfishly, where at least one of the nodes operates 
unselfishly in some point of the decision chain.  
Decision-making based on the information is not always complete, and information gaps must 
be considered in decision-making. The lack of information may mean that the nodes do not 
know the precise objectives or use of the other nodes. Variable Yi is defined as the set of 
signals that cognitive element i observes to learn about the actions of all elements in the 
network (including itself). The probability that action a was the action given that yi belongs to 
Yi was observed is denoted by P[a|yi]. The feature of ignorance [94], [96] occurs when at any 
stage in the decision sequence an ignorant decision is made. An ignorant decision occurs 
when a cognitive element has partial knowledge. This means for some i that there exists an 
   (3) 
Ignorance occurs when at least one cognitive element in the decision sequence makes an 
ignorant decision. 
When the network operates under fully observable actions, and has the feature of knowledge. 
A knowledgeable decision occurs for some i when there exists an 
   (4) 
Full knowledge occurs when all elements make knowledgeable decisions at every stage in the 
decision sequence.[94], [96] 
Fully controllable or partially controllable network elements are essential for cognitive 
network to gain maximum performance. In an ideal situation, all the network elements and 
parameters are controlled by the cognitive layer. In this case, the network can be optimized 
for each situation or end-to-target perfectly. For a cognitive network with k instances of the 
functionality in the network, and x instances of the functionality under cognitive control, 
partial control [96] occurs when 
      (5) 
For a cognitive network with k instances of the functionality in the network, and x instances of 
the functionality under cognitive control, full-control [96] occurs when 
      (6) 
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4.5. Security Threats to Cognitive Networks 
Security of the cognitive networks is widely researched and discussed [15], [17], [20], [62], 
[77]. Although, the most of the traditional cyber threats (e.g. TCP/IP threats, man-in-the-
middle, etc.) are valid, cognitive networks also face some unique security challenges not 
faced by conventional wireless or wired networks. In an ideal CN, security of the network is 
provided as a result of a cognitive process, which generates new threats. For instance, 
incomplete situation awareness or a disturbed decision-making process may lead to the 
decision not to use any security controls for certain communications although it is extremely 
required. 
Table 8 presents three new cyber security threats related to cognitive networking. The first 
column of the table describes the threats that are sensor input violation, information sharing 
violation and data storage attack. In the second column, description is given, and the third 
column states the implication when the threat has been triggered. 
Table 8: Major security threats in cognitive networks. 
 
In the cognitive network, locally-collected and exchanged information is used to construct a 
perceived information environment that will influence both current and future behaviors. By 
violating sensor data, information sharing and history data (databases), an attacker is able to 
change the information environment. Training with the incorrectly perceived environment 
will cause the CN to adapt incorrectly, which affects short-term behavior. Unfortunately, the 
CN uses these adaptation experiences as a basis for new decisions. Thus, if the malicious 
attack perpetrator is clever enough to disguise their actions from detection, they have the 
opportunity for long-term impact on behavior. Furthermore, the CN collaborates with its 
fellow nodes to determine behavior. Consequently, this provides an opportunity to propagate 
behavior through the network in much the same way that a malicious worm. 
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One of the main security concerns in CNs is an attacker spoofing faulty sensor information 
causing a network node to select an undesired configuration. By manipulating the receiving 
information the attacker can feed faulty statistics data to be stored in the knowledge database 
of a network node. Further decisions based on the current situation and information in the 
knowledge database may not be optimal as the stored information is not valid. 
Ensuring security of information sharing between cognitive nodes will be vital. To function 
optimally the nodes of cognitive network must exchange lots of control information. 
Corrupting control data causes a reduced capability to optimize network behavior within all 
the other nodes in the network. A single node may still be able to make optimal decisions, but 
cognitive behavior is limited to the single node. In that case, the cognitive network no more 
exists. 
4.6. Conclusions  
The cognitive networks create a new perspective to the development of military 
communications systems. In the future, the cognitive networks will offer better possibilities to 
support the high requirements for battlefield communications. From a technical performance 
point of view, four value-added factors can be highlighted. The first factor is time. A 
cognitive, self-adaptive network is able to respond quickly to the required network changes, 
primarily caused by the movement of troops and individual soldiers, and by establishing 
situational awareness and C2 capabilities on the battlefield. Cognitive networking can reduce 
the delay of manual network planning and configuration. Faster network convergence 
accelerates the deployment of tactical networks, and thus information sharing between the 
troops and actors. 
The second factor is the interoperability of heterogeneous communication system devices. 
Achieving the maximum effectiveness of NCW the full interoperability between the actors’ 
networking systems, interfaces and protocols is required. Interoperability is a key for today’s 
joint operations where military services and branches conduct operations side by side. 
Cognitive, software-programmable network devices allow adaptation of networking protocols 
and parameters. For example in radio networks, this means that waveforms can be modified in 
such a way that the nodes do not interfere with each other. The cognitive process allows the 
actors equipped with different types of systems to communicate with the others. Improved 
interoperability enhances also reachability of network nodes. The more nodes are compatible 
the wider area of network coverage can be obtained. The gateways between cognitive network 
elements are transparent which enables information transfer between the network elements, 
and thus the quality of information can be maintained at the high level. 
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The third factor to which cognitive networking affects in the network infrastructure is more 
efficient use of network resources. In tactical military networking, this particularly means the 
efficient utilization of electromagnetic spectrum. Legacy tactical combat radios utilize the 
frequency spectrum only partially. The cognitive radio network is able to identify and utilize 
unused parts of the spectrum. In the future, dynamic spectrum usage will be an important 
capability as the number of wireless devices keeps growing. The effective use of network 
resources is not limited to the efficient use of spectrum, because the cognitive network is able 
to utilize available bandwidth capacity, security controls and other resources. The efficient 
use of network resources also means that information services do not allocate too much 
network capacity or resources. 
From the perspective of this thesis, security as the fourth factor is the most interesting. In 
theory, a cognitive system is able to take into account all the security requirements throughout 
the entire communication network. The network is able to adapt its security mechanisms and 
parameters according to the end-to-end-goals derived from security policies. The network 
adapts automatically to the desired security level, which minimizes security vulnerabilities 
caused by human errors and omissions. The cognitive process can control and monitor overall 
security instead of having separated management processes for each security control. 
The cognitive networks introduce promising features to support and enhance security of 
tactical military networks. However, we must remember that when a communication system 
becomes more and more complex, a number of vulnerabilities in the system increase. The 
cognitive process, control channels, input sensors and additional databases are new targets for 
the enemy, and they open new attack surfaces to be exploited. 
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5. CYBER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present an overview and comprehensive description of 
the cyber security architecture and the functionalities of the architectural elements and layers. 
Describing the functionalities of the architecture excludes technical details such as protocols 
and algorithms, because the overall purpose of the architecture design is to define the 
functional elements. The presented architecture is built to meet the requirements and 
conditions set out in the previous chapters. After presenting the overview of the architecture, 
each element of the architecture and their tasks are defined in more details. 
Before the actual presentation of the architecture, different types of security architecture 
models and frameworks are reviewed in the beginning of the chapter. The purpose is to prove 
that existing models and frameworks fit poorly into describing a cyber security architecture 
for tactical military networks. Thus, the proposed architecture is described as a layered 
functional block diagram without a tight coupling to the reviewed models. 
5.1. Security Architecture Frameworks and Models 
Security architecture can be defined as the design artifact that describes how the security 
controls and security countermeasures are positioned, and how they relate to the overall 
information technology architecture. These controls serve to maintain the system's security 
quality attributes which typically are confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and 
assurance services. [71]  
The purpose of the network security architecture for cognitive military networks is to reduce 
security risks according to risk analysis and security policies. It is not possible to create an 
architecture having no holes, and trust in the provided security mechanisms in all battle space 
conditions. Thus, the focus is on reduction risks and enforcing policy through the design and 
configuration of network equipment. Traditional network security design and architectures 
have focused on creating a secure network perimeter around the organization placing security 
devices and controls at the point where the network is connected to the other networks or the 
Internet. Especially in military networks, the isolation (no connection to any other networks) 
was a key deign factor for decades. [57] 
An architecture framework is used for an architecture design. The architecture framework [1] 
establishes a common practice for creating, interpreting, analyzing and using architecture 
descriptions within a particular domain of application or stakeholder community. Typically an 
architectural framework consists of a standard set of views, which each have a specific 
purpose. 
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Lots of different architecture frameworks have been developed [88], but most of them have a 
scope on enterprise and business level architectures. These frameworks present design models 
for generating layered architectures supporting enterprise and business process. Information 
sharing is a key issue with these enterprise level architecture frameworks, but not too many of 
them discuss on communication networks or network security although security is somehow 
considered at least on high level. 
An enterprise information security architecture framework is only a subset of enterprise 
architecture frameworks. Figure 11 simplifies the conceptual abstraction of a high-level 
conceptual security architecture framework within a generic enterprise information 
framework [32]. Security is connected to all three architectural areas. At the business 
architecture, security concerns policies and rules, and at the information architecture, the goal 
is to ensure secure data processing. At the technology architecture, security must ensure that 
applied technological solutions support security requirements and goals.  
 
Figure 11: High-level conceptual security architecture framework. 
iCode Security Architecture Framework [44] developed by iCode Information Security is one 
of the attempts to provide an architecture framework including all required security controls 
whether they were procedural or technical. The purpose of the framework is to help 
organizations prevent damages to assets by building security controls blocks and deliver a 
layered protection against the perceived cyber threats with a cost effective implementation. 
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The iCode framework covers the three fundamental tenets of information system security; 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The framework also includes three information 
system dimensions that are the business, the information, and the technical dimensions. In the 
framework, standards play a significant role and provide guidance and interchange 
capabilities of elements within the architecture. [44] 
iCode Enterprise Security Architecture Framework is illustrated in Figure 12. The technical 
viewpoint includes conceptual, logical and implementation levels. At the implementation 
level, the technical reference model sets boundary conditions for security functionality and 
technologies. Then, security controls are figured within three architectures: security 
infrastructure, security services and application security. 
 
Figure 12: iCode Enterprise Security Architecture Framework. 
Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) [86] is a model and a 
methodology for developing a risk-driven enterprise information security architecture. The 
goal of the architecture is to deliver security infrastructure solutions that support critical 
business initiatives. The main feature of the SABSA model is that all functionality must be 
derived from an analysis of the business requirements for security. Especially, the business 
areas in which security has an enabling function for new business opportunities. 
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The SABSA process analyzes the business requirements at the outset, and develops a chain of 
traceability through the strategy, design, implementation and lifecycle to ensure that the 
business opportunities are maintained. Practical experience is a basis for framework tools that 
further support the whole SABSA methodology. The SABSA model is generic and can be the 
starting point for any organization. By going through the process of analysis and decision-
making implied by its structure, the architecture becomes more specific to the organization, 
and finally, the architecture is highly customized to a unique business model. [86] 
The SABSA uses a layered model in which the top layer consists of the business 
requirements. On the way to the bottom layer, a new level of abstraction and detail is 
developed. The process goes through the definition of the conceptual architecture, logical 
services architecture, physical infrastructure architecture and finally at the lowest layer, 
component architecture with the selection of technologies and products. The service 
management architecture connects these five architectures as depicted in Figure 13. [86]  
 
Figure 13: The SABSA layered model for security architecture. 
In the SABSA model, each horizontal architecture layers (illustrated in Figure 12) have also 
vertical cuts that answer the questions [86]: 
 What are we trying to do at this layer? (protect assets, data, etc.) 
 Why are we doing it? (motivation) 
 How are we trying to do it? (processes and functions) 
 Who is involved? (people and organizational aspects of security) 
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 Where are we doing it? (locations where to apply security) 
 When are we doing it? (time-related aspects) 
These six vertical architecture elements are combined with six horizontal architecture layers 
which create a six by six matrix of cells representing the whole model for the enterprise 
security architecture. The table is called the SABSA Matrix that in shown in Figure 14. The 
SABSA developing process is a process of describing all of these thirty-six cells of the table. 
The SABSA Matrix also provides two-way traceability. The matrix allows tracing every 
requirement through to the components that provide a solution when the fulfillment of the 
requirements is considered. On the other hand, the matrix can be used to check the relevance 
of each security component at the bottom layer. A single component requirement can be 
traced all the way back to the top layer of the business requirements that describe the specific 
solution. 
We can also find a few defense related architecture frameworks such as MODAF (UK 
Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework) [61], DoDAF (US Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework) [29] and NAF (NATO C3 Systems Architecture Framework) [66]. 
These frameworks include little about security issues, and once security is taken account it is 
presented at a very high level. MODAF and DoDAF are discussed more in details in the 
following sections. 
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Figure 14: SABSA matrix (the whole model for the enterprise security architecture). 
The Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) [29] is an architecture 
framework for the United States Department of Defense that provides structure for a specific 
stakeholder concern through viewpoints organized by various views. These views act as 
mechanisms for visualizing, understanding, and assimilating the broad scope and complexities 
of an architecture description through tabular, structural, behavioral, ontological, pictorial, 
temporal or graphical means. The framework is especially suited to large systems with 
complex integration and interoperability challenges, and is apparently unique in its use of 
"operational views" detailing the external customer's operating domain in which the 
developing system will operate. The DoDAF viewpoints are presented in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: The DoDAF viewpoints. 
The current version of the DoDAF treats security as any other requirement. The DoDAF does 
not contain any separated security-specific viewpoint. Security information can be presented 
on models using annotations and call-outs. The DoDAF model comprises the concepts, 
associations, and attributes for capturing and representing security characteristics in a 
consistent way between models. A formal processing of security features is important because 
many of the artifacts such as nodes, interfaces, systems have several security requirements. 
Some of the items decomposed in the architecture are actually security implementations (e.g. 
authentication). Also, some components cannot function without security.[29] 
The DoDAF model is effective at mapping operational activities to systems, but capturing and 
modeling security threat and attacks or their countermeasures is not easy using the 
framework. Attempting to detach security features into other activities is challenging, 
especially when it appears that many of the activities themselves are enabled or protected by 
security mechanisms. For example, modeling confidentiality is difficult while it causes 
activities in almost every other activity. [26]  
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MODAF [61] is an internationally recognized enterprise architecture framework developed by 
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD) to support defense planning and change 
management activities. Originally the purpose of MODAF was to provide an accurate 
structure to support the definition and integration of MOD equipment capability, particularly 
in support of Network Enabled Capability (NEC). MODAF was developed from the 
previously introduced DoDAF, but has been extended and modified to meet UK requirements 
by the addition of Strategic, Acquisition and Service Oriented Viewpoints. The MODAF 
viewpoints are quite similar to the DoDAF viewpoints. The viewpoints are [61]: 
 Strategic Viewpoint (desired business outcome, required capabilities) 
 Operational Viewpoint (processes, information and entities needed to fulfill the 
capability requirements) 
 Service Orientated Viewpoint (services required to support the processes described in 
the operational views) 
 Systems Viewpoint (physical implementation of the operational and service orientated 
views) 
 Acquisition Viewpoint (dependencies and timelines of the projects that will of deliver 
the solution) 
 Technical Viewpoint (standards that are to be applied to the solution) 
 All Viewpoint (description and glossary of the contents of the architecture). 
As in the DoDAF model, MODAF includes no security view. Security information can be 
shown on views using annotations and call-outs similarly to DoDAF. Furthermore, some add-
ons have been developed to the framework to support security aspects. For instance, a model 
library provided with the MODAF Meta-Model underpins the representation of security 
characteristics in a consistent way between models [43].  
The previous architecture frameworks architectures are created for an enterprise level use. A 
challenge is to find a framework that concentrates on technical security and gives guidelines 
and methods to design a technical network security architecture formally. On the other hand, 
many lower level security architectures consider technical security at a very detailed level. 
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Typically, the low level architectures address a certain security control or a single security 
control (e.g. cryptography, software code, and authentication).  For example, Security 
Architecture for Survivability Mechanisms [18] presents a novel framework to facilitate 
software security against malicious execution environments, and describes the design, 
implementation, and analysis of an approach to the problem of software security in 
untrustworthy environments. Another example is a Mobile Ad Hoc Network Security 
Architecture [18] that is based on the use of an immune agent system. Immune agents are 
network nodes that either detect possible invaders or counterattack. When invasion is detected 
by a detection agent, it sends out directions to all neighbor nodes around the attacker to active 
counterattack agents, to surround and isolate the attacker node. The scope of the architecture 
is very limited, and it does not present any security controls in practice. 
The Cisco Network Security Baseline [69] presents the fundamental network security 
elements that are critical to developing a strong network security baseline. The focus is 
primarily on securing the network infrastructure itself, as well as critical network services. 
The baseline utilizes the Cisco Security Framework (CSF) that is a security operational 
process model targeted at ensuring network, and service, availability and business continuity. 
The CSF is designed to identify current threat vectors, as well as track new and evolving 
threats due to an ever-moving target of cyber security threats.  
The CSF is describes two fundamental objectives; total visibility and complete control. To 
gain the total visibility and complete control, the CSF uses multiple technologies and 
capabilities throughout the network to gain situational awareness into network activity, 
enforce network policy, and detect anomalous traffic. Figure 16 illustrates the Cisco Security 
Framework with six key elements (identification, monitoring, correlation, hardening, 
isolation, enforcement). 
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Figure 16: Cisco Security Framework overview. 
The Cisco Network Security Baseline does not offer an effective architectural views or 
structures that would help to design new network security architectures. The baseline and the 
CSF are especially designed for configuring network devices and services. Thus, the baseline 
provides detailed guidance on how to implement each security control and best practice, along 
with plenty of configuration templates and examples [69]. Obviously, most of the security 
controls implemented in the Cisco systems are relevant and useful for the cognitive military 
networks. 
The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) has published several standards 
and recommendations for telecommunication systems security. ITU-T recommendations are 
created from a technical point of view, making them more interesting for this research. The 
ITU-T recommendations are not such architecture frameworks, but they still include 
systematic matters to build security in networking devices. 
Recommendation X.805 (Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end 
communications) [55] defines the general security-related architectural elements that, when 
appropriately applied, can provide end-to-end network security. The recommendation 
addresses security concerns for the management, control and end-users through three layers; 
network infrastructure, services and applications. This approach is similar to one presented in 
the previous iCode security architecture framework. Figure 17 illustrates the X.805 security 
architecture. 
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Figure 17: X.805 security architecture overview. 
The older ITU-T recommendations X.800 [83], X.802 [45]  and X.803 [58] consider security 
through the OSI layers defining the requirements for security and characterizing the 
approaches to satisfying these requirements. The recommendation X.800 describes the 
Reference Model including the general security-related architectural elements which can be 
applied appropriately in the circumstances for which protection of communication between 
open systems is required. 
Recommendation X.802 describes the cross layer aspects of the revision of security services 
in the lower layers of the OSI Reference Model (Transport, Network, Data Link, Physical). It 
describes the architectural concepts common to these layers, the basis for interactions relating 
to security between layers and the placement of security protocols in the lower layers. X.803 
Recommendation describes the selection, placement and use of security services and 
mechanisms in the upper layers (applications, presentation and session layers) of the OSI 
Reference Model. A common factor for these ITU-T recommendations is that they all use the 
security services (dimensions) described in Section 2.4.  
From the review of the architecture frameworks and models, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
1. Some of the models (MODAF, DoDAF) are high-level architecture frameworks, and they 
do not originally include any security related views. Typically they are specially designed for 
military organizations, but the focus is more on command and control applications than on 
communications networking. 
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2. The presented security architectures (SABSA, iCode) are overall security architectures, and 
they attempt to describe enterprise-level security management and controls. The architecture 
models are difficult to use for describing a cyber security architecture of military networks, 
because the models do not introduce any functional or component-level features. 
3. Technical security architectures (e.g. Cisco Security Framework) are created to support the 
network devices of a certain manufacturer. These architectures typically define how to the 
devices are to configured to provide a desired security level. The architectures are 
independent and open, but they are based on certain technologies and devices. 
4. ITU-T recommendations are more promising. They define technical security requirements 
and mechanisms in different scenarios. A challenge is that the ITU-T architecture documents 
only present the technical requirements at each system layer, but do not show how the 
architecture layers are built with smaller blocks and security elements. 
5. None of the architecture models or frameworks introduces any cognitive processing. This is 
natural because the research area of the cognitive networks is quite new, and cognitive 
systems are still in a prototyping phase. 
5.2. Overview of Cyber Security Architecture  
Figure 18 presents the overview of cyber security architecture for the cognitive military 
networks. The architectural design is based on a block diagram that describes functional 
element at five functional layers. As it was stated in the end of the previous section, the 
reviewed architecture models were difficult to apply to the proposed architecture. Thus, this 
proposed architecture model is not based on any existing model or framework. However, the 
layered approach of the ITU-T X.805 recommendation is utilized in the architecture design. 
Also, the overall structure of the cognitive system framework presented in Figure 10 is 
exploited to create the cognitive layer to the cyber security architecture. 
The functional layers of the architecture are Security Policy and Management Layer, 
Cognitive Layer, Application Security Layer, Service Security Layer, and Infrastructure 
Security Layer. The layers are implemented in each network node throughout the entire 
network. The nodes may be mobile or fixed, and man-packed or vehicle-mounted. Security 
controls and settings are controlled and optimized from three perspectives; a single network 
node, a network cluster, and an entire network. 
      68 
 
Figure 18: Overview of the cyber security architecture. 
At the top of the architecture, security policies and goals are set and executed at the Security 
Policy and Management Layer which then guides and controls the Cognitive Layer. In 
addition to the Security Policy and Security Goals elements, the Security Management Layer 
also includes the Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM) element that provides cyber 
security threat and vulnerability libraries to the Cognitive Layer. This input includes security 
goals for user access (e.g. authorization, authentication), data classification levels, 
cryptography algorithms, key patterns, security requirements for data transport, etc. The 
security policies and goals are manually set in an initiation phase of network deployment.  
During the operational phase, some situations require that modifications to the goals and 
policies are conducted. The threat and vulnerability libraries are updated continuously during 
the operational phase of the network. The Security Management Layer also receives 
information from the Cognitive Layer. This information contains data about network 
adaptation decisions, current setup, and detected anomalies. 
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The main task of the Cognitive Layer is to provide a cognitive process for decision making 
and to execute the security adaptations in a network node. The process follows the previously 
introduced OODA loop with the observation, orientation, decision-making and acting phases. 
The layer is connected to the Application Security Layer, Service Security Layer, and 
Infrastructure Security Layer in two ways. Firstly, the Cognitive Layer controls and adjusts 
Security Control Elements (SCE) of these three layers according to the adjustment orders 
(based on the decisions), and secondly, the Cognitive layer monitors all the Security Control 
Elements and receives status data from them. 
The security controls of the cognitive military network are implemented at three separated 
layers; Application Security Layer, Service Security Layer, and Infrastructure Security Layer. 
These layers are built in accordance with the ITU-T X.805 recommendation [85].  The layers 
are a series of enablers for securing networks; the infrastructure layer enables the services 
layer and the services layer enables the applications layer. According to the recommendation, 
each layer has different security vulnerabilities and offers the flexibility of countering the 
potential threats in a way most appropriate for a certain security layer. 
The Infrastructure Security Layer includes the security controls of network transmission 
facilities, and individual networking elements. The infrastructure layer represents the most 
vital base when building blocks of networks, services and applications [85]. Network 
elements belonging to the infrastructure layer include individual routers, switches, servers, 
and the communication links (wireless and fixed) between these routers, switches and servers. 
In a context of the military tactical networks, the Infrastructure Security Layer mainly consists 
of mobile tactical network nodes that provide both networking and information service 
capabilities to the end-users. 
The Services Security Layer addresses security of services that a network provides to the end-
users. These services range from basic transport and connectivity to service enablers like 
those that are essential for providing service and network access (e.g. 
authentication/authorization services, dynamic host configuration services, domain name 
services, etc.) to value-added information services such as military C2 tools, location services, 
messaging, VPN connections, etc. 
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The Applications Security Layer concentrates on security of the network-based applications 
accessed by end-users from commanders to regular soldiers. The end-user applications are 
enabled by network services and infrastructure, and they consist of basic C2 applications, file 
transport/storage applications, voice messaging and email, video collaboration, etc. The 
applications may be provided using data centers or local servers. 
Security Control Elements provide appropriate security controls at each of these three layers. 
The controls can be classified into three categories according to the timescale of an incident. 
Before the incident occurs, preventive controls are intended to prevent an incident from 
occurring by e.g. blocking unauthorized user access. Detective controls are design to act 
during the event, and they are planned to identify and characterize an incident in progress, and 
to alert other security controls (in automated systems) or network security personnel (manual 
incident handling). After the event, corrective controls are used to limit any damages caused 
by the incident e.g. by separating damaged network segments, filtering traffic, or recovering 
damaged services. 
The Security Control Elements provided by the security architecture include the following 
components of security protection [107]: 
- Integrity protection components generate and authenticate the digital signatures and 
authentication messages for the purpose of entity and data integrity. 
- Confidentiality protection components encrypt and decrypt data (files, message, 
packets) to protect the confidentiality of data in all processing or transferring phases. 
- Vulnerability management components automatically scan and update the system 
vulnerability of network nodes and patch the security holes. 
- Authentication components provide authentication services for network nodes, and for 
example, negotiate the session key required by secure communication. 
- Access control components receive and request access control lists and authenticate 
the access control requirements of network nodes. 
- Communication insulation components configure and manage network 
communication connections and implement traffic monitoring and for example packet 
filtering. 
- Malware protection components automatically scan and remove viruses and 
automatically update malware libraries. 
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- Security audit components automatically follow and record the operation logs of 
network infrastructure, services and applications. 
- Intrusion detection components automatically detect and record hostile intrusion 
events and cyber attacks, and distribute warning information to related control 
components. 
In addition to the cognitive layer and process, the implementation of cognitive security 
features requires the security controls to be fully software-controlled. This means that all the 
security elements are controlled by software.  Another requirement for the security controls  is 
an ability to collect status information from the security control elements. 
5.3. Infrastructure Security Layer 
The Infrastructure Security Layer architecture describes the security controls to prevent cyber 
attacks causing damages to data transition, communication links, and their supporting control 
capabilities such as routing, and network access. In a context of the military tactical networks, 
the Infrastructure Security Layer mainly consists of mobile tactical network nodes that 
provide both networking and information service capabilities to the end-users. 
Securing the infrastructure layer consists of securing the control or signaling information (e.g. 
routing information) that resides in the network nodes as well as securing the receiving and 
transmission of control or signaling information by the cognitive military network node. 
Securing the infrastructure layer is also concerned with securing the operations, 
administration, maintenance, and provisioning of the individual network elements, wireless 
and fixed communication links, and mobile server platforms. 
The Infrastructure Security Layer protects user data packets as they are transported through 
the network nodes, as well as, they are being transported across wireless and fixed 
communications links. Figure 19 presents the architecture of the Infrastructure Security Layer 
that contains six separated security elements to provide efficient security controls for 
management, control and end-user data at the infrastructure layer. The infrastructure layer is 
connected to the other layers as depicted in the overall architecture view in Figure 18. The 
features of each element are described in the following sections. 
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Figure 19: Overview of Infrastructure Security Layer. 
Cryptography Element (CE) 
The Cryptography Element provides cryptographic services to protect outgoing packets from 
losing confidentiality. At the infrastructure layer, the cryptography element encrypts the 
control and addressing data of outgoing packets, and decrypts the same data of incoming 
packets. The purpose of the element is to protect data packets against discovering control (e.g. 
routing, addressing, etc.) information. Table 9 illustrates the tasks and cognitive management 
of the element. The cognitive layer controls the element by setting up cryptographic 
algorithms and distributing keys. The third column of the table defines what information is 
collected to the cognitive process from the element. 
Table 9: The tasks and management of the Cryptography Element.  
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Control message encryption 
(for routing, QoS, 
authentication, access, etc.) 
Cryptographic algorithm selection 
Key distribution 
Algorithms in use 
Current key 
Control data decryption (for 
routing, QoS, authentication, 
access, etc.) 
Cryptographic algorithm selection 
Key distribution 
Algorithms in use 
Current key 
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Routing Security Element (RSE) 
The main purpose of the Routing Security Element is to ensure that routing is secured and 
operational during network operations. The element guarantees that only valid routing updates 
are approved. The element also filters adverse or fake routing information. Table 10 illustrates 
the tasks and cognitive management of the Routing Security Element. The element 
authenticates and authorizes the sources of routing update information. Invalid sources are 
rejected. The status of accepted and blocked routing updates is collected by the cognitive 
layer.   
Table 10: The tasks and management of the Routing Security Element. 
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Routing update authentication Information of valid nodes  Authenticated network nodes 
Routing update authorization Information of permission to 
exchange routing data 
Authorized network nodes 
Filtering List of accepted routing information 
sources 
Blocked routing information 
sources 
Packet Access Control Element (PACE) 
The task of the Packet Access Control Element is to provide authentication, and authorization 
services for data packets. The access control element guarantees that only valid traffic packets 
enter into a network node. The element also adds authentication information on outgoing 
packets. The purpose of the element is to prevent that malicious packets arrive at the node.  
Table 11 presents the tasks and cognitive management of the Packet Access Control Element. 
The cognitive layer controls the packet access control element by providing valid 
authentication and authorization information. The cognitive layer takes care of access lists and 
valid authentication keys so that correct packet sources are accepted and packets from 
unknown or hostile sources are dropped. 
Table 11:  The tasks and management of the Packet Access Control Element.  
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Identification of incoming 
packets 
Authentication key distribution 
List of valid packet sources 
Incoming packet sources 
Authorization of incoming 
packets 
Distribution of authorization 
information (access lists) 
Authorized packet sources 
Add authentication information 
to outgoing packets 
Distribution of authentication 
information (keys) 
Status of authentication 
information (keys, etc.) 
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Traffic Shaping Element (TSE) 
The purpose of the Traffic Shaping Element is to generate and modify data traffic on each 
communication link so that traffic flow do not disclose communication behavior, and thus, 
command and force structures. This critical information can be observed by looking at the 
traffic flow instead of looking at the payload content of the packets. Traffic flow can often 
expose that there is communications, the volume, and who is communicating to whom. 
Traffic flow can be protected by padding of data such that the links are always fully utilized 
regardless of the end-user traffic volumes. 
The task of the Traffic Shaping Element is to generate bulk traffic to communication links so 
that the traffic rate of a link is constant. By eavesdropping the link the enemy has a challenge 
to figure out if transmitted data is operational or just bulk. The cognitive layer controls the 
element by setting up the current traffic rates at each link. Status information collected by the 
cognitive process includes information of current link utilization. 
Management Access Control Element (MACE) 
Secure node management is important to prevent unauthorized configuring of a network node. 
Especially, when the cognitive process automatically controls and reconfigures system 
parameters, it is critical to have appropriate access control for node management. All 
management requests are authenticated. In an ideal system, a whole management is provided 
by the cognitive layer, but some manual configuration may also be required in certain 
situations. Although, all the management commands are mostly incoming from the node’s 
own cognitive process, in some cases the source of a management message may be 
somewhere else in the network. Thus, it is critical to have a full controlled access mechanism 
to management data. 
Table 12 illustrates the tasks and cognitive management of the Management Access Control 
Element. The tasks are authentication and authorization of incoming management data. The 
cognitive layer updates access information about valid management sources and permissible 
services to be configured. As a feedback to the cognitive process, the element provides 
information about current management sources and managed services. Also, the element 
informs the cognitive layer about the blocked management source. 
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Table 12: The tasks and management of the Management Access Control Element. 
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Authentication of management 
data 
Updating authentication information Current management 
sources 
Blocked management 
sources 
Authorization of management 
data 
Updating authorization information Currently reconfigured 
services 
 
Management Log Element (MLE) 
The main purpose of the Management Log Element is to provide a management audit trail for 
the network. The task is simply to store information of the management sessions into a log 
file.  The cognitive layer sets up the requirements for information to be collected. Typically 
these include a source ID, date, time, and the changes that are made. The cognitive layer 
collects data of the status of the log file, and for example, cleans the files when they become 
too large. 
5.4. Services Security Layer 
Building security controls at the Service Security Layer may be complicated, because network 
services are often built-upon one another. For instance, in order to provide a secure email 
service, a cognitive military network has to provide a simple IP service that relies on enabling 
services such as DHCP, DNS, and authentication [85]. The network should also provide 
cryptography and QoS services to meet end-user’s quality and security requirements for the 
secure email service. 
The Services Security Layer includes the security controls that protect data used by network 
services. Protecting the end-user data traffic of the network services means, for example, that 
the confidentiality of a user's conversation is protected in a VoIP service or a DNS service is 
secured to ensure the confidentiality of users. Securing the control or signaling information 
used by the network service concerns, for example, issues of securing the SIP protocol that is 
used for the VoIP sessions. Securing the management of the network services consists of the 
protection of the Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning (OAM&P) 
functions of the network services. This also includes securing the configuration of network 
services.   
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Figure 20 presents the architecture of the Service Security Layer that consists of six separated 
security elements to provide efficient security controls for management, control and end-user 
data. The layer has input and output connections to the cognitive layer allowing the cognitive 
layer to control the security elements, and to collect status data from the elements. The 
Cryptography Element, Management Log Element and Management Access Control Element 
provide the same functionalities as those at the infrastructure layer (see Figure 19), and they 
are described in the previous section. The features of the rest of the element are described in 
the following sections. 
The purpose of the Cryptography Element is to secure all the messages concerning service 
controls. The Management Access Control guarantees that only allowed management 
messages are passed to control the service layer.  The Management Log Element stores all the 
management sessions for the service layer.  
 
Figure 20: Overview of Service Security Layer. 
      77 
Service Access Control Element (SACE) 
The purpose of the element is to control access to the network services. The element prevents 
access from unknown and hostile sources that may be both end-users and other services. The 
tasks of the element are equals to those shown in Table 11 except that authentication and 
authorization is provided to the service access messages instead of the packet source. The 
cognitive layer controls what services are accessible to different end-users and other services. 
The cognitive layer collects information about the current service usage status and dropped 
access requests. 
Traffic Monitoring and Filtering Element (TMFE) 
The main tasks of the Traffic Monitoring and Filtering Element are related to those provided 
traditionally by firewalls and anti-virus software. The Element monitors incoming and 
outgoing data traffic to prevent, detect and remove malware in all descriptions. The Element 
also provides the control of the incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing the data 
packets and determining whether it should be allowed through or not. The element also 
monitors anomalies from network traffic 
Table 13 shows the tasks and cognitive management of the element. Detecting malware from 
network traffic is based on information about anomalous traffic behavior and malware 
signatures. The cognitive layer updates signatures, filtering settings and distributes 
information about traffic behavior. The cognitive layer collects data about traffic statistics, 
incidents and other suspicious traffic. 
Table 13: The tasks and management of the Traffic Monitoring and Filtering 
Element.  
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Detection of malware from 
incoming traffic   
Distribution of signatures Malware incidents 
Detection of malware from 
outgoing traffic   
Distribution of signatures Malware incidents 
Filtering incoming traffic from 
unpermitted sources 
Filtering setup for incoming traffic Dropped traffic 
Filtering outgoing traffic to 
unpermitted destinations 
Filtering setup for outgoing traffic Dropped traffic 
Anomalous traffic detection Updating information about normal 
traffic baseline and anomalous 
behavior 
Detected anomaliess 
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Vulnerability Management Element (VME) 
The Vulnerability Management Element is a component that collects information about 
system vulnerabilities, and executes patching when a fixing piece of software is available. The 
purpose of the element is to keep the network nodes up-to-date as rapid as possible. 
Vulnerability information is based on information about software and firmware versions of 
system elements. The element also runs black box testing called fuzzing [79] in which 
services or components are provided with invalid, unexpected, or random input data. 
Table 14 lists the tasks of the Vulnerability Management Element. The tasks consists of 
collecting vulnerability information, patching and fuzzing. The cognitive layer controls the 
element by setting data collection requirements (what information is collected concerning 
vulnerabilities), by distributing available security patches, and by guiding fuzzing (target 
services and systems, fuzzing settings, etc.). Sensor data to be gathered includes information 
about vulnerabilities and fuzzing results. 
Table 14: The tasks and management of the Traffic Shaping Element. 
Tasks Cognitive control Sensor data 
Collecting vulnerability 
information 
Setting data collection 
requirements 
Vulnerable services, software 
and firmware 
Vulnerability patching Distributing available security 
patches 
- 
Fuzzing Information about elements or 
services to be tested 
Testing results 
5.5. Application Security Layer 
Securing the applications layer includes securing data generated by end-user applications. The 
applications may be locally installed or they may be network-based (server-client solutions). 
In the military environment, the applications have high requirements for processing, sharing 
and storing classified information to ensure operational security. For example, the 
confidentiality of force tracking data must be protected by a military C2 application. Securing 
the applications layer also includes the protection of the control or signaling information used 
by the network-based applications. An example of this is securing the email protocols (e.g. 
IMAP) used to control the delivery of email. 
The OAM&P functions and the configurations of the applications must also be secured. For 
an email application, this means that, for instance, the provisioning and administration of user 
mailboxes is protected.  
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Figure 21 depicts the architecture of the Service Security Layer with five separated security 
elements to provide efficient security controls for management, control and end-user data at 
the application layer. The Cryptography Element, Management Log Element and 
Management Access Control Element provide the same functionalities as those at the 
infrastructure layer (see Figure 19), and they are described in the previous section. The 
features of the rest of the element (Node Access Control Element and Application Access 
Control Element) are described in the following sections. 
The purpose of the Cryptography Element at the application layer is to encrypt and decrypt all 
application traffic. The Management Access Control protects the management of the 
applications allowing only authorized access to application management data.  The 
Management Log Element stores all the management sessions for the applications.  
 
 
Figure 21: Overview of the Application Security Layer. 
Node Access Control Element (NACE) 
The task of the End-User Access Control Element is to provide authentication, and 
authorization services for end-users accessing to a network node. The main purpose of the 
element is that only legitimate users are able to access and connect to the network node.  
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The tasks of the element simply consist of authentication and authorization processes to 
provide access to the node. The cognitive layer controls the element by providing valid 
authentication and authorization information. The cognitive layer takes care of distributing 
authentication authorization information (keys, certificates, access lists, etc.). The cognitive 
layer also provides the list of legitimate users. As sensor data, the cognitive layer collects 
information about current users of the node and rejected access requests. 
Application Access Control Element (AACE) 
The Application Access Control Element provides authentication, and authorization services 
for end-users accessing to the applications located in a local or remote node. The main 
purpose of the element is that only legitimate end-users are able to use applications. Hostile or 
unknown end-users are rejected by the element. 
Generally, the tasks of the element are the same as those of the Node Access Control Element 
include authentication and authorization of an end-user. The cognitive layer controls element 
by providing valid authentication and authorization information for application access. The 
cognitive layer distributes authentication and authorization information, and updates the list of 
the legitimate users. The element provides information about current users, applications they 
use and rejected application accesses as input data to the cognitive layer.  
5.6. Cognitive Layer 
The cognitive layer presented in Figure 18 functions as “brains” for the network. The layer 
implements the cognitive process and previously introduced OODA loop with the phases of 
observation, orientation, decision-making and adaptation. The layer receives information from 
all the security elements at the infrastructure, service and application security layers. This 
information consists of data described in the previous sections where the security layers are 
presented in more details. At the same time, the cognitive layer controls the security elements 
according to the decisions made in the decision-making phase. 
The cognitive layer is connected to the security policy and management layer in the 
orientation and acting phases. The security policy and management layer provides end-to-end 
security goals that are considered in the orientation phase in which current situational data, 
history data and the goals are fed into the decision-making process. On the other hand, the 
acting phase pushes overall situation information to the management layer. 
      81 
The cognitive layer is distributed over the entire network trough the control channel presented 
in Figure 18. The control channel is a vital part of the system as it shares situational 
information between the network nodes. The control channel is important when network 
parameters are optimized over the network. Several algorithms can be applied for optimizing 
and decision-making [58], but researching algorithms is not in the scope of this study. 
As it is seen in the overview figure, in a sense of parameter optimizing, the network is divided 
into three areas. The first area includes a single node, and optimizing is conducted within this 
single node. In this case no control channel is required, and the nope is able to make decisions 
with information collected from its own elements. The second optimizing area consists of a 
cluster of nodes. In that case, the network is divided in sub networks on which specific end-
to-end targets are set. Optimizing is provided among the nodes inside the cluster. The third 
optimizing area involves all the nodes of the network, and optimizing is performed within the 
whole network. The cluster and entire network wide optimizing requires an effective control 
channel so that parameter values can be shared between the nodes. A weakness of the control 
channel is resource consumption. The distributed channel requires computational capacity, 
link capacity, channel protocols and obviously security protection. 
The network performance depends on the amount of available network state information at 
the cognitive layer. In order to make beneficial and optimal decisions, the cognitive layer 
must receive and have the latest information from all software controlled network security 
elements. Obviously, decisions made by the cognitive layer are better than those made in 
ignorance. However, in complex systems such as tactical military networks, it is unlikely that 
the cognitive layer would know the complete system state. [97] The tactical networks are 
often challenging (e.g. weak links, connectivity problems, scarcity of bandwidth) when 
sharing status information between the network nodes, meaning the cognitive layer have to 
work with less than a full picture of the network and security status. 
5.7. Security Policy and Management Layer 
The security policy and management layer is located on the top of the cognitive layer (see 
Figure 18). The purpose of the layer is to manage and control the cognitive layer. The 
management layer consists of three management components that are Security Policy, 
Security Goals, and Threat and Vulnerability Management. In this section, these components 
are described in more details. 
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Security policies are the basis for all information security planning, design, and deployment. 
Policies direct implementers and end-users how issues should be addressed and technologies 
should be used. Typically, policies do not specify the proper operation of equipment or 
software, but it sets limitations how networks are operated and how information is processed 
in the networks. A policy is a plan or course of action that conveys instructions from an 
organization’s security management to those who make decisions, take actions, and perform 
other duties. [102] In this case, these instructions are created for the cognitive layer.  
A security policy may include the following issues: 
- Access control. Access rules and rights for applications, databases, portals and 
services are defined through access control.  
- Configuration rules. System configuration processes and limitations are defined in 
security policies. 
- Processing classified information. The requirements for processing classified 
information are defined in policies. 
It is important to ensure that the security policy is enforced by mechanisms that are strong 
enough. In the case of cognitive networking, the policy enforcement is provided by an 
automated process. Thus, the enforcement process does not include any manual enforcement 
by human network operators creating fewer possibilities that the policy is not followed. 
The main task of the security goals management is to describe the end-to-end security goals 
for the network performance. The goals are sent to the cognitive process that optimizes 
network parameters to achieve the goals. The security goals include for example approved 
encryption algorithms, key lengths, access protocols and controls, overall security controls in 
each node, etc. The security goals should provide information for the cognitive process 
enough to set the optimized parameter values for all configurable security elements. 
Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM) has an important role in today’s cyber threat 
environment. Using TVM the network is able to adjust its parameters to defend against cyber 
threats. The threat and vulnerability management component maintains the libraries of current 
threats and threat scenarios. The component also provides threat and vulnerability information 
for the risk assessment implemented at the cognitive layer. 
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5.8. Defense in Depth  
In this section, the proposed architecture is considered from the Defense in Depth perspective.  
Defense in Depth is an information assurance (IA) concept in which multiple layers of 
security controls are placed throughout information systems and networks [27]. The purpose 
is to provide redundancy in the case a security control fails or vulnerability is exploited. The 
concept covers aspects of personnel, procedural, technical and physical security, but in this 
section we focus on the technical aspects. 
The idea behind the defense in depth concept is to protect a system against any particular 
attack using several independent methods and protection layers. The placement of protection 
mechanisms, procedures and policies is intended to increase the reliability of an information 
system and network where multiple layers of defense prevent espionage and direct attacks 
against critical systems. In terms of computer network defense, defense in depth measures 
should not only prevent security breaches, but also buy an organization time to detect and 
respond to an attack, thereby reducing and mitigating the consequences of the attack. [10] 
The Defense in Depth strategy introduces five technological approaches [27] to improve the 
network’s ability to defend against cyber attacks. The approaches are considered from the 
cyber security architecture point of view in the following paragraphs. 
Defense in Multiple Locations. Adversaries can attack a target from multiple locations using 
either insiders or outsiders. A network system needs to deploy protection mechanisms at 
multiple locations to resist different types of attacks. The proposed architecture implements 
security elements and controls in each network node. The protective mechanisms such as 
access control, encryption, traffic shaping, anomaly detection, traffic filtering and monitoring, 
are located multiple points throughout the entire network. 
Layered Defenses. Even the best available security technology has inherent weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities that an adversary will find and exploit sooner or later. An effective 
countermeasure is to place multiple defense mechanisms between the edge of the network and 
a target service or information. Each of the security mechanisms must present a unique 
obstacle to the attacker. The mechanisms should include both “protection” and “detection” 
measures to help detecting the attacker at each layer of defense. The security architecture 
composes this layered defense by having several security elements to be passed before 
accessing to user data or services. These elements include encryption, traffic filtering and 
monitoring, and access controls at several layers.  
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Security robustness. The security robustness (strength and assurance) of each security 
component must be specified as a function of the value of what’s it is protecting and the threat 
at the point of application. For instance, deploying stronger security mechanisms at the 
network boundaries is often more effective than deploying these mechanisms at the user 
desktop. The security robustness of the proposed architecture is carried out by the distributed 
implementation of the cognitive layer and security controls. The architecture includes no 
single point of failure. The security management is distributed so that each node can still 
operate locally without any connection to other nodes. However, without a control channel 
connections the node cannot adapt its security parameter optimally because vulnerability, 
threat and status information is not shared between the nodes. 
Robust key management. Key management services and mechanisms should be implemented 
to support security technologies and to be highly resistant to cyber attacks. Key management 
infrastructures are lucrative targets for an attacker as we know that key management is one of 
the most critical issues in the networks. In the proposed architecture, key management is 
controlled by the cognitive layer which should be aware of key distribution situation 
throughout the network. The architecture does not describe key management mechanisms, but 
naturally key management is protected with all the available security elements. 
Intrusion detection. Infrastructures should provide sufficient capabilities to detect and  
analyze intrusions, and to correlate the results and even react accordingly. The cyber security 
architecture present the Traffic Monitoring and Filtering Element to overcome detection 
challenges. Each network node is capable of detecting anomalous traffic and intrusions. 
5.9. Conclusions 
The purpose of the proposed cyber security architecture is to determine the structure of 
security controls and management of a military communication network from a functional 
perspective. For describing an architectural design method, several existing architecture 
models and frameworks were studied. The aim was to find a suitable architecture model for 
the cyber security architecture. The reviewed architectures included both military and 
enterprise related frameworks and models. The military architecture frameworks are 
originally designed for developing command and control (C2) applications, and do not 
typically include security perspectives. Some add-on security features are introduced, but 
these features are still at a very high level. However, some security specified architecture 
models are created for the enterprise level design. A problem is that they concentrate on 
overall security in an enterprise, and do not include methods to design architectural views for 
technical communication security. 
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The biggest challenge with applying the reviewed architecture models is that none of the 
architecture models has been developed to describe cyber security of communication 
networks from a technical point of view. Most of the models contain different views for 
describing business or organization-level functions from administrative issues to technical 
standards. The architectures related to technical information security are typically based on 
based on the practical implementation of the existing equipment and technologies. A good 
example is the Cisco Security Framework that describes how security issues are considered in 
Cisco devices. On the other hand, for example in ITU-T recommendations focus on 
describing the functional security requirements instead of specifying an exact security 
architecture or security controls. 
The proposed architecture aims to meet the today’s requirements for cyber security of military 
communications. As the existing architecture models were difficult to use, the presented 
architecture was described as a simple functional block diagram. The military communication 
network consists of three functional layers as introduced in the ITU-T X.805 
recommendation. In addition to these layers, the architecture defines the cognitive and 
management layers that are based on the cognitive system framework. 
Each layer is composed of functional security elements whose basic functions were defined. 
The main task of the security elements is to protect the information content and data packets 
so that the requirements described in the previous chapters can be fulfill. The elements were 
only defined at the functional level, and the practical implementation of the elements was not 
investigated. The implementation may show that the architecture must be modified, if the 
functionality of the elements cannot be reasonably implemented. A risk is that implementing 
the full functionality may result in lead to a very complex system. 
The architecture design allows that the security elements are flexibly added, deleted, or 
modified. However, we must remember that the proposed architecture does not exactly define 
relationships between the elements, and how the elements are connected to each other. The 
layered approach provides depth in security protection. The Defense in Depth requirements 
are fulfilled by using several consecutive security controls, decentralized service structure, 
and wide network monitoring and incident detection. Reliability is increased by distributing 
security controls and services to all nodes in the network. A drawback is that the 
decentralization complicates the system structure, which may increase the vulnerability of the 
system and implementation difficulties. 
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Cognitive functionality may add value to the maintenance of security in the network. A smart, 
cognitive process enables automated risk management and updating systems in real-time. The 
cognitive process modifies system parameters so that protection is align with the current 
threat environment, and in a case of attacking, the network is able to start counter operations 
without a human network operator. The biggest challenges in the implementation of the 
cognitive layer are related to the development of decision-making algorithms, and  a secure 
and resource-effective control channel. The control channel can significantly consume 
network resources that are scarce especially in tactical military networks (e.g. link capacity, 
processing power, power supplies). 
The proposed architecture includes the management layer that is important in cognitive 
systems where the cognitive process requires the goals and objectives for parameter 
optimizing. In the cyber security architecture, the management layer sets end-to-end security 
goals for the network so that information processing and sharing is performed securely. The 
management layer also includes the threat and vulnerability library which is an important part 
of the management layer in the cognitive network. The library ensures the security elements 
are configured to protect against latest threats and attacking scenarios. 
The functionality and compliance of the cyber security architecture is very essential and even 
critical. Thus it is important that the proposed architecture is evaluated against threat 
scenarios. The original architecture design could be improved according to evaluation results. 
The purpose of the evaluation is also to show that the architectural design is at a certain level 
after the detailed description of the elements could be started. The proposed cyber security 
architecture is evaluated in the following chapter. 
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6. EVALUATION 
Evaluation is a key process to prove compliance of the proposed cyber security architecture. 
In this chapter, two separated methods are presented and used for the evaluation. The 
evaluation is carried out against the threat scenarios presented in Chapter 3. In the beginning 
of this chapter, a variety of different evaluation methods and criteria are reviewed. The 
purpose is to show how these existing methods inadequately support the evaluation of 
network security architecture. For this reason, the used evaluation methods must have been 
applied in a new way.  
6.1. Evaluating Security Architectures - Methods and Criteria 
It is clear that designing a network architecture with security functions will produce a more 
secure architectural design and eventually more secure networks, yet it is still not obvious 
how to evaluate and conduct this intuitive process. It is also clear that a good architectural 
design is one that performs certain tasks (i.e. functionalities) and exhibits certain properties 
(e.g. security) [81]. Evaluation of architectures and designs is important, and in a case of 
security it is critical. 
The main problem about security assessments is that the security of a given architecture 
cannot be measured directly. No single value or component of the network can reliably tell us 
how secure a system really is. Actually, this is a general problem that security assessments 
have to face. Besides, a chance remains that an inherent vulnerability of a system has not yet 
been disclosed, that some kind of backdoor in a piece of software still is to be revealed. As a 
consequence, it is very difficult to develop security evaluation methods which provide reliable 
feedback about a system. [65] 
We can find several different methods for evaluating and assigning assurance levels to 
information and communications systems. Two reasons for several assurance evaluation 
methods could be found; evaluating methods and ideologies have developed over time, and 
various groups of experts look at computer security differently and rate some aspects of 
security differently. The purpose of an evaluation program is to establish a trust between the 
customer and the product vendor. [65] Three most-known security evaluation criteria are 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
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Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [100] is a United States Government 
Department of Defense (DoD) standard that sets basic requirements for assessing the 
effectiveness of computer security controls built into a computer system. The TCSEC was 
used to evaluate, classify and select computer systems being considered for the processing, 
storage and retrieval of sensitive or classified information. The TCSEC was initially issued in 
1983 by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), an arm of the National Security 
Agency, and then updated in 1985. TCSEC was replaced by the Common Criteria 
international standard originally published in 2005. 
The Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [100] is a structured set of 
criteria for evaluating computer security within products and systems. The ITSEC was first 
published in 1990. Following extensive international review, Version 1.2 was subsequently 
published in June 1991 by the Commission of the European Communities for operational use 
within evaluation and certification schemes. Since the launch, a number of other European 
countries have agreed to recognize the validity of ITSEC evaluations. The ITSEC has been 
largely replaced by Common Criteria, which provides similarly-defined evaluation levels and 
implements the target of evaluation concept and the Security Target document. 
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (abbreviated as 
Common Criteria or CC) [23] is an international standard for computer security certification. 
Common Criteria is a framework in which computer system users can specify their security 
functional and assurance requirements, vendors can then implement and/or make claims about 
the security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to 
determine if they actually meet the claims.  
In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of specification, 
implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a 
rigorous and standard manner. The CC offers a set of well understood security functional 
requirements that can be used to create trusted products reflecting the needs of the market. 
These security functional requirements are presented as the current state of the art in 
requirements specification and evaluation.  
Some criticisms against these evaluation criteria have shown up [51]. Typically, evaluation 
focuses primarily on assessing the evaluation documentation, and not on the actual security, 
technical correctness or merits of the security product. Only the highest levels of the 
evaluation require deeper, full source code analysis. Evaluation using the criteria is also a 
costly process, and the evaluation does not make a product more secure. 
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The effort and time necessary to prepare evaluation evidence and other evaluation-related 
documentation is so large that the product under evaluation is generally superseded by the 
time the evaluation work is completed. Other concerns are the lack of control over the actual 
production of the products once they are certified, and the absence of a permanently staffed 
organization that monitors compliance. 
The reviewed evaluation criteria are designed for security products. Thus, it is challenging to 
apply the criteria for evaluation of a cyber security architecture of cognitive networks without 
an existing product or prototype. For this reason, the TCSEC, ITSEC and CC are not 
reasonable for the evaluation of the security architecture, and thus, they are not used for 
evaluation. In this study, the proposed cyber security architecture is evaluated by comparing 
the new architecture to the legacy architecture of military networks. The comparison is made 
using two different approaches. The first approach is to apply the previously introduced 
SABSA matrix, and compare how different security controls and procedures are concerned at 
each layer against the threats of each scenario. The second approach uses a scenario based 
evaluation model that was originally developed for the evaluation of software architectures. 
6.2. SABSA Based Evaluation 
The purpose of the SABSA based evaluation is to use the traceability of the SABSA Matrix 
(presented in Section 5.1) to ensure that the security elements at the bottom level of the 
proposed cyber security architecture are relevant to the threat scenarios at the top level. Figure 
22 illustrates the traceability of architectural design. For example, a component security 
solution must fit into the architectural design at the next layer (physical security) proceeding 
all the way to the contextual security layer. 
 
Figure 22: The traceability of The SABSA Matrix. 
The SABSA Matrix was originally developed to cover overall security threats against 
business processes and actions [86]. Thus, it is challenging to modify the matrix and attributes 
to meet the technical cyber security requirements. The modification is started by describing 
the components and procedures of information system that are needed to be protected against 
cyber threats of the military environment. The objects to be protected are defined at all the 
layers of the SABSA Matrix. These objects are presented in Table 15. 
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The second phase is to modify the top row of the columns of the SABSA Matrix so that they 
include all the threats of the threat scenarios presented in Section 3.4. An example of that is 
depicted in Figure 23, in which the threats of the integrity violation threats scenario are added 
at the top row of the matrix. 
Table 15: The protected objects at each SABSA Matrix layer in the context of military 
networking. 
Layer Objects to be protected 
Contextual Architecture Operational continuity 
Continuous command, control and communications capabilities 
Conceptual Architecture Availability of critical operational information 
Information sharing with strategic partners 
Recoverable networks and information services 
Logical Security Architecture Network topologies 
Command structures 
Communication profiles 
Information service structure 
Information sharing structures 
Network gateways 
Physical Security Architecture Critical data repositories 
Critical network nodes 
Component Security 
Architecture 
Network components: 
- Servers 
- Routers 
- Databases 
- Communication links 
Security Service Management 
Architecture 
Maintaining security service management: 
- Key management 
- Component management 
- Policy management 
- Access management 
 
Finally, the protected objects are analyzed with each threat resulting an evaluation report that 
reveals the effectiveness of the elements of the architecture. The results will be more 
qualitative than quantitative.  The SABSA Matrix does not output any checklists, or other 
metrics to follow. The matrix produces a holistic view how security controls are designed to 
protect against the threat scenarios. The SABSA matrix returns no absolute results of the 
security level. Thus, it is more reasonable to compare the results of both proposed and legacy 
cyber security architectures. 
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Figure 23: An example of addressing the threats of the integrity violation scenario 
when evaluating the layers of the SABSA Matrix.  
6.3. Scenario Based Evaluation  
Alkussayer and Allen [9] present a scenario-based framework for evaluating the security of a 
software architecture. Although, the framework is not originally developed for network 
security architecture, it is a promising approach to evaluate a high-level network security 
architecture. The inspiration for the scenario-based evaluation framework comes from 
recognition of the critical need for assessing the security of a system through its architectural 
design to disclose the underlying compliance of the architecture to the stakeholder's security 
needs. The proposed technique strengthens the security of a system architecture by combining 
three distinct factors seamlessly into a solid framework. 
Evaluation Process 
The evaluation process is based on a scenario-based architecture review. An architecture 
review is an efficient approach of ensuring design quality and addressing architectural 
concerns. The key goals of conducting an architecture review are to evaluate an architect’s 
ability to deliver a system that fulfills the security quality requirements and to identify 
potential security risks. The use of scenarios is maturing process and has proven to be a 
successful practice [22].  
The scenario-based security evaluation both provides an assessment of quality attributes and 
explores the interactions and interdependencies of those quality attributes, highlighting trade-
off mechanisms and opportunities between quality attributes [9]. Another factor is the 
combination of a risk analysis. The goal of identifying potential risks can be a normal part of 
the architecture review. The framework supplements the use of a well-known risk analysis 
model for application security called OWASP's Risk Rating Methodology [73]. 
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Integrating security patterns to the framework enhances the quality of security components in 
the architecture. The framework includes security patterns not only for the risk analysis, but 
also as a core component of each security scenarios that contains the security profile. The 
scenario-based evaluation framework includes six phases that are defining the evaluation 
goal, generating security scenarios, creating the security profile, describing the architecture, 
evaluating scenarios and analyzing results. The evaluation process with these six phases is 
illustrated in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24: The security evaluation framework. 
 Defining the Evaluation Goal 
The first phase is to determine the goal of the evaluation. This includes the declaration of the 
expected outcomes of this evaluation. Typically, the assessment process may have three types 
of goals; quantitative, qualitative or trade-off. In the quantitative assessment, the goal is to 
predict the level of security supported by the architecture. In many cases, a prediction is 
supposed to be an indicator rather than an absolute quantitative measure of security which 
may not even be feasible with all designs. 
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The goal with qualitative assessment is to compare two or more possible candidate 
architectures to decide which supports the best security. The trade-off assessment attempts to 
discover the right level of the security support with respect to other quality attributes of the 
target system. 
Generating Security Scenarios 
The second phase of the process is to create the security scenarios. A coherent and logical 
security scenario is a key for the relevant evaluation results. To generate a reasonable 
scenario, threat modeling and security requirements must be considered closely. Threats can 
be well defined and classified using several threat models [89]. However, it is not clear how 
the threat profiles could be used as an assessment instrument. Also, security requirements by 
themselves are not enough to build a security scenario. The security requirements describe a 
threat to the system in the context of functional requirements, but do not consider the threat 
profiles. Thus, a beneficial security scenario is a combination of security threats, requirements 
and patterns [9].  
Alkussayer and Allen [9] propose a systematic approach to generate a coherent security 
scenario. The formal definition of the security scenario is as follows: 
 ,    (7) 
where S is the set of security scenarios such that si corresponds to the security scenario for the 
threat i, and n is the total number of identified threats. The scenario si is described as a tuple: 
 ,    (8) 
where ri  R, ti  T and pi  P. R, T, and P represent security requirements, threats, and 
security patterns respectively. The template includes five elements that are requirement, 
threat, precondition, behavior, and patterns. 
A requirement is the specific security requirement describing the desired security property of 
the target system. It is significant to be able to trace a security scenario back to its 
fundamental requirements because of understanding different trade-offs. 
A threat is an act to elicit a negative response in the system. The threat may explicitly 
(directly) or implicitly (indirectly) violate the security requirement. The threat must be 
imported from the threat profile [89]. 
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Precondition is the description of potential system constraints that may cause the security 
scenario to occur. 
Behavior is the expected behavior of the system when a specific scenario is tested. It is 
important to focus exclusively on security and avoid defining the system behavior from other 
quality-attribute viewpoints (e.g. performance). 
Patterns should to be combined in order to mitigate the corresponding threat and protect the 
required behavior. 
Each threat scenario is linked to a specific security requirements, potential threats, and 
security pattern(s) that may be used to remediate that threat. 
Creating Security Profile 
The security scenario profile includes the identified security scenarios that are going to be 
used during the evaluation analysis of the security architecture. Two key factors that impact 
on the generation of the scenario profile are selection criteria and prioritization. 
A complete selection includes all scenarios that may potentially occur. Although it is essential 
to include all identified scenarios into the profile, the complete selection is impossible to 
achieve because security is a moving target and new threats are developing all the time 
changing the threat landscape continuously. Thus, an appropriate method for selection of 
representative scenarios depends on the risk related to each scenario. The process of 
associating risk values with each scenario in the profile is described using the standard risk 
model [73]: 
 Risk = Likelihood x Impact   (9) 
The OWASP Risk Rating Methodology (RRM) proposes two factors to estimate the risk 
likelihood and two factors to estimate the risk impact. The risk likelihood is estimated using a 
threat agent factor or a vulnerability factor. The risk impact is evaluated using a technical 
factor or a business factor. Each of these four factors has a set of options which have rating 
from 0 to 9. In this study, the risk likelihood is based on the vulnerability factors, and the risk 
impact estimation is provided through the technical factors. The threat agent factor and the 
business impact factor have been omitted to maintain simplicity. In a military context, the 
business factor is not very relevant as the ultimate goal is to maintain the network operational 
in all conditions. 
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The OWASP Risk Rating Methodology uses the simple numerical values (0-9) during the 
estimation process to simplify the analysis process. The numerical values are replaced by the 
corresponding rating levels later in the process. The likelihood and impact levels of are: 
 0 ≤ 3 Low 
 3 ≤ 6 Medium  
 6 – 9 High.  
The Full Scenario Table (FST) is used to extract scenarios from the security scenario profile. 
The output of the process is a simplified representation of the security scenario profile with a 
set of scenarios. During the process, all of the scenarios (S) developed in the previous phase 
are entered into the FST. The FST consists of four columns that are the scenario number, 
threat, patterns, and security objectives. The security objectives column is divided into sub-
columns that represent the desired security objectives of the system. 
It is normal to generate some scenarios without associated patterns because of two reasons. 
First, a pattern for newly emerged threats may not exist, and secondly, the cyber threat is to be 
mitigated by using an established best practice. In any case, it is vital to include the scenarios 
without patterns in the Full Scenario Table to assure that the security architecture has 
addressed all the threats and their countermeasures. An example of FST is presented in Figure 
25. 
 
Figure 25: An example of Full Scenario Table (FST). 
Scenario 
# 
Threat Patterns Security Objectives Risk 
SO1 SO2 SO3 SO4 SO5 SO6 SO7 
1 Denial-
of-
Service 
α1 5 5 9 1 2 2 4 High 
1 SQL 
Injection 
α2, α3 8 4 9 9 4 5 9 Medium 
3 Data 
Storage 
Attack 
- 3 4 8 9 9 3 8 Critical 
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Threats and patterns to protect against threat are located in the second and third column of the 
table. The following columns include the evaluation how a certain security objective is 
achieved. Finally, the risk value is calculated in the last column. The purpose of the 
prioritization of the profile is to highlight the scenarios that include more risks. The security 
scenarios are prioritized by using the risk level identified earlier in the FST. 
Evaluating the Scenarios 
Evaluating the cyber security architecture is provided by comparing the required security 
functionalities with the provided security capabilities. The scenarios in the Full Scenario 
Table indicate the required security functionalities of the system. The security scenarios 
profile generated earlier is used for the evaluation process in which the security architecture is 
analyzed for its support of each security scenario. 
The security evaluation framework (see Figure 24) introduces three methods for scenario 
evaluation; pattern-based, risk-based and design decision-based evaluation. The pattern-based 
evaluation requires examining each scenario from the security profile and heuristically 
evaluating the architecture using the list of identified patterns in the scenario. A challenge 
with this method is that it requires expert-based identification of any security pattern that 
influences security in the system [9]. 
The design decision-based evaluation is based on analysis of the structural components of the 
system and their interrelationship. Every design decision that is identified is used to evaluate 
the security support for each security scenario. For each scenario in the security profile, the 
impact of the design decision is analyzed, and whether this decision has resulted in sufficient 
support for the scenario. 
The risk-based evaluation is a process that estimates and associates risk weights to every 
scenario row in the Full Scenario Table. The evaluation is conducted by estimating the impact 
and likelihood of each scenario. The technical impact  of a scenario si in the Full Scenario 
Table is described as the average of the impacts I on corresponding security objectives SOj 
when threat in the scenario is realized. The formalization of this calculation is defined by: 
    (10) 
The vulnerability factor  of the scenario si is estimated by averaging the vulnerability 
factors VFj for each scenario si. The average is calculated by the following: 
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    (11) 
If a scenario consists security patterns, their improvement effect ( , ,…, ) is 
defined to reduce the likelihood estimation of the scenario. However, patterns vary in their 
expected resistance to attacks and hence the lack of pattern resistance LPR is determined. If 
multiple patterns are applied to a single scenario si, then is as follows: 
     (12) 
Finally, the likelihood of the scenario si is calculated by: 
     (13) 
The risk of the scenario si could be then calculated by using the standard risk equation: 
     (14) 
Figure 26 illustrates the RRM [11] severity levels. The overall risk severity level is achieved 
as a combination of the levels of impact and likelihood. For example, if the impact level is 
high and the likelihood level is medium, the final risk level is high. Focusing on severity 
levels to complete the risk evaluation may take a purer meaning and draw greater attention 
than numerical values. Thus, it is recommended to use the severity levels in the scenario 
based evaluation [9]. 
 
Figure 26: Risk severity levels. 
In the end of the evaluation process, the results from the overall analysis of the architecture 
are summarized which may disclose some general security indicators. For example, the 
number of supported security scenarios can be compared with the number of scenarios not 
supported, or the total number of available security patterns (controls) can be compared with 
the number of patterns (controls) required by the profile. 
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Also, it is possible to synthesize risk values associated with each threat to the scenario 
template. As a result, an overall quantitative indicator of the evaluation can be determined. 
However, such a quantitative metric of the software design is outside the scope of this paper. 
During the evaluation process, the accumulated results must be documented. If the desired 
security level is not achieved, then some architectural modification must be applied to 
overcome the lack of security support. 
6.4. Evaluation Results 
The proposed cyber security architecture was evaluated by applying the previously presented 
evaluation methods. The architecture was valued against the four threat scenarios presented in 
Table 7. The scenarios describe typical threat scenarios concerning tactical military networks. 
An adversary launches attacks to achieve desired effects on an opponent’s networks. A 
primary target may often be classified information, but the enemy may also want to deny the 
availability of network services. Instead of launching cyber attacks through networks, the 
enemy can use kinetic power to destroy a critical node or databases. The tested scenarios are 
not complete as it was stated earlier, but they may cover most of the current cyber threats. 
Results of SABSA Based Evaluation 
The SABSA based evaluation was executed by analyzing the architecture with the SABSA 
matrix. The evaluation matrix was generated for each threat scenario as demonstrated in 
Figure 23. All the threats of each threat scenario are estimated through the layers of the 
SABSA matrix. The purpose is to analyze how the architectural design with the security 
elements and the cognitive functionalities overcome the requirements for security at each 
SABSA layer. 
The analysis is provided by considering each threat and the security controls of the 
architecture against the objectives presented in Table 15. As a result, a matrix cell describes 
how the architecture mitigates the threat at each SABSA layer.  For example, when analyzing 
the Conceptual Architecture layer, the targets of security include availability of critical 
operational information, information sharing with strategic partners, and recoverable networks 
and information services. By examining the overall architecture and the tasks of each security 
element and layer, it is possible to see if any mechanisms for protection exist. 
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The evaluation results are presented in Tables 16 - 19. The colors in the matrices indicate the 
fulfillment of the requirements. The green color indicates that the architecture meets the 
security requirements for a threat. The yellow color shows that the architecture does not fully 
meet the requirements, and the functionality of the elements must be improved. The red color 
indicates that the design fails, and the architecture does not include the functions to protect 
information against a specific threat at a certain SABSA layer. It is important to notice that 
the physical protection is not in the scope of the architecture, and thus, the physical security 
layer results in the yellow color. However, some security features also protect against physical 
damages. 
When examining the SABSA evaluation results it should be noted that the results presented in 
the tables are mostly based on the author's analysis and understanding of the functionality of 
the proposed architecture and its layers and security elements. The results could not have been 
directly calculated quantitatively using mathematical formulas. This is of course natural, since 
the architecture or its performance is not described mathematically, and the technical 
parameters of the architecture have not been determined precisely. 
On the other hand, the attack patterns of the threats in each threat scenario are not specified or 
described. For example, the attacker’s cyber knowledge, tools and resources are unknown, 
and, the exact knowledge of used vulnerability or attack methods is missing. Therefore, these 
results should be interpreted carefully.  
Table 16: Evaluation of the architecture against the scenario of integrity violation. 
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Table 16 presents the evaluation results in the threat scenario of integrity violation. As it is 
seen in the table, the purposed architecture seems to support the protection of integrity 
violation against each cyber threat. At the contextual layer, the architecture presents 
distributed services and controls and secured data services to prevent user data, routing and 
configuration alteration and violation. The main weaknesses in the scenario are in the 
protection against node capture. By monitoring nodes and using strong cryptographic 
algorithms it is possible to check that the nodes are under control and data stored in a node is 
secured. The strong algorithms are naturally more difficult to break but it is still just a matter 
of time when the most of cryptographic algorithms are to be broken [59]. 
Table 17 shows the evaluation results in the threat scenario of the prevention of availability. 
All the threats in the table have a goal of denying availability of network access and services. 
At the Contextual, Conceptual and Logical layers the cyber security architecture uses 
distributed and cognitive security services providing continuous in network and service 
operations as the network has no single point of service production. On the other hand, the 
cognitive process takes care of dynamic service reconfiguration so that blocked services is set 
up in a new location or/and with new parameters. 
Table 17: Evaluation of the architecture against the scenario of the prevention of 
availability. 
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At the Component Security layer, the architecture protects against availability prevention by 
having authentication, encryption and traffic filtering capabilities in each network node. At 
the security service management layer, traffic and status monitoring ensures that anomalous 
packets are dropped. The control message authentication prevents unauthorized control 
messages to cause denial of services. 
Table 18 shows the evaluation results in the threat scenario of the confidentiality violation. At 
the highest layers of the SABSA matrix, the threat is defended by having secured information 
processing and sharing with strong authentication and encryption. At the Component level, 
the threats are minimized through the security elements of the architecture. 
Table 18: Evaluation of the architecture against the scenario of confidentiality 
violation. 
 
The confidentiality violation threat through node capturing is difficult to counter as the 
captured node is open to an enemy to investigate databases and security control structure. 
With automated data clearing and strong cryptographic algorithms the threat is trying to be 
minimized. Other unsatisfied security implementations concern the unprotected network 
access and traffic tracking at the logical level. The proposed architecture does not propose any 
mechanism to provide the flat logical topology. 
The evaluation results in the threat scenario of the physical destruction are presented in Table 
19. At the three highest layers of the SABSA model, the physical destruction threat is 
mitigated by implementing distributed information services and node control in order to 
leaving no single point of failure in a case of physical influence. 
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Table 19: Evaluation of the architecture against the physical destruction scenario. 
 
The proposed architecture does not include any physical protection at the component level 
which is seen as the yellow color in the matrix. However, the distributed and cognitive 
services fill the holes in physical protection in many cases. The system management is 
distributed among all the network nodes so that losing the network nodes does not disable the 
network management services. 
Results of Scenario Based Evaluation 
The first step in the scenario based evaluation is to determine the goal of the evaluation. In 
this evaluation, the goal was to evaluate the security risk of the proposed architecture design. 
In the second step, the threat scenarios presented in Table 6 were chosen for the evaluation. 
The scenarios include a total of 24 threats. The third step is to create the security scenario 
profile using the FST. Each threat was analyzed against specific security requirements, and 
security pattern(s) that are designed in the proposed architecture to remediate that threat.  
For technical impact factors and vulnerability factors we use the values presented in Tables 20 
and 21 are used. The factors are based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [73]. The 
impact and vulnerability factors are derived from the security dimensions listed in Table 2. 
Finally the impact and vulnerability factors were calculated using Equations (10) - (13). 
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Table 20: Technical Impact Factors. 
Impact Factor Definition Rating 
Loss of  
Confidentiality 
(LC) 
 
How much data could be 
disclosed and how 
sensitive it is. 
 
2 = Minimal non-sensitive data disclosed 
6 = Minimal critical data disclosed 
6 = Extensive non-sensitive data disclosed 
9 = Extensive critical data disclosed, all data disclosed 
Loss of 
Integrity (LI) 
 
How much data could be 
corrupted and how 
damaged it is. 
1 = Minimal slightly corrupt data 
3 = Minimal seriously corrupt data 
5 = Extensive slightly corrupt data 
7 = Extensive seriously corrupt data 
9 = All data totally corrupt 
Loss of 
Availability 
(LA) 
 
How much service could 
be lost and how vital it is. 
1 = Minimal secondary services interrupted 
5 = Minimal primary services interrupted 
5 = Extensive secondary services interrupted 
7 = Extensive primary services interrupted 
9 = All services completely lost 
Loss of 
Accountability 
(LAC) 
 
Actions by the attackers 
can be traced to an 
individual. 
1 = Fully traceable  
7 = Possibly traceable 
9 = Completely anonymous 
 
Table 21: Vulnerability Factors. 
Impact 
Factor 
Definition Rating 
Ease of 
discovery 
(ED) 
 
How easy it is for 
attackers to discover the 
vulnerability. 
 
1 = Practically impossible 
3 = Difficult 
7 = Easy 
9 = Automated tools available 
Ease of 
exploit (EE) 
 
How easy it is for 
attackers to actually 
exploit the vulnerability. 
1= Theoretical 
3 = Difficult 
5 = Easy 
9 = Automated tools available 
Awareness 
(AW) 
How well known this 
vulnerability is to the 
attackers. 
1 = Unknown 
4 = Hidden 
6 = Obvious 
9 = Public knowledge 
Intrusion 
detection (ID) 
How likely an exploit is to 
be detected. 
1 = Active detection in application 
3 = Logged and reviewed 
8 = Logged without review  
9 = Not logged 
 
The results are presented in Tables 22 - 25. A risk value (the last column in the tables) has 
been resulted by first calculating the average values of the impact factors (LC, LI, LA, LAC) 
and the vulnerability factors (ED, EE, AW, ID). Then, the influence of the security patterns 
(security controls and functionality of the architecture) is reduced from the averaged 
vulnerability factor by multiplying the vulnerability factor with the lack of pattern resistance 
defined by Equation (12). The security elements are denoted with the acronyms presented in 
Sections 5.3 - 5.5. The improvement effect α of the security elements gets the values from 0 to 
1 where 1 equals to full mitigation (no vulnerability). 
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Finally, the numerical values are converted to the likelihood and impact levels (low 0 ≤ 3, 
medium 3 ≤ 6 and high 6 – 9), and the final risk value is obtained by using the risk severity 
levels of the table presented in Figure 27. We must note that the assignment of technical 
impacts, vulnerability factors, and pattern resistance (improvement effect) is done based on 
the author’s experience and literature review. Thus, the numerical values in the tables are not 
based on any mathematical analysis. 
The Full Scenario Table of the integrity violation scenario is presented in Table 22. The 
column of Security Controls defines what controls in the architecture mitigate the threat at 
each line. A numerical value in brackets indicates an estimated value of the improvement 
effect. For example, in the case of End-user data alteration (#2) the average of the impact 
factors is 2.00. The average of the vulnerability factors (3.25) is multiplied by the lack of 
pattern resistance (LPR = 1 - 0.9) which leads to the likelihood value of 0.325. Thus, the both 
likelihood and impact factors are low, and the final risk severity level is note. The risk 
severity level of the other threats is calculated in the same way. 
Table 22: The Full Scenario Table for the integrity violation scenario. 
# Threat Security  
Controls (α) 
Impact Factors Vulnerability Factors Risk 
LC LI LA LAC ED EE AW ID  
1 Control message 
alteration 
CE, PACE (0.8) 1 1 6 - 3 2 4 1 Note 
2 End-user data 
alteration 
CE, PACE, AACE 
(0.9) 
2 3 1 - 3 3 5 2 Note 
3 Configuration 
alteration 
CE, PACE, MACE 
(0.9) 
2 3 5 - 3 5 6 2 Medium 
4 Node capture (I) CE, TMFE (0.3) 4 3 1 4 5 6 8 2 Medium 
5 Routing violation CE, RSE (0.7) 1 2 3 - 3 2 3 1 Note 
 
The Full Scenario Table of the prevention of availability scenario is presented in Table 23. In 
the prevention of availability scenario, the threat of corrupting critical data is small compared 
to the impact on service and data availability. The main security controls against the threats 
are packet authentication, distributed services, cryptography, and traffic monitoring. The table 
shows that the availability prevention threat is mainly low with the security elements and 
functions proposed in the architecture. The risk level of availability prevention in the node 
capture threat is medium indicating that it is difficult to protect data and services in a captured 
node. 
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Table 23: The Full Scenario Table for the prevention of availability scenario. 
# Threat Security  
Controls (α) 
Impact Factors Vulnerability Factors Risk 
LC LI LA LAC ED EE AW ID  
6 Flooding PACE, TMFE, RSE 
(0.8) 
1 1 7 8 9 8 8 1 Low 
7 Node capture (A) Distributed 
services, Cognitive 
service 
management (0.2) 
6 1 9 7 7 7 8 2 Medium 
8 Malformed 
control 
messages 
CE, PACE (0.6) 1 1 7 8 8 8 6 2 Low 
9 Connection 
hijacking 
TMFE, RSE, 
cognitive link 
management (0.8) 
1 1 3 6 3 5 8 3 Low 
10 Quality-of- 
Service abuse 
CE, PACE (0.6) 1 1 5 8 5 3 7 2 Low 
11 Server 
impersonating 
MACE, PACE, CE, 
TMFE (0.9) 
1 1 9 8 6 5 8 2 Low 
 
Table 24 presents the Full Scenario Table of the confidentiality violation scenario. The table 
shows the highest risk caused by masqueraders, which is obvious because it is very difficult to 
detect a illegitimate user with a valid ID. Node capture, software vulnerabilities and 
unauthorized activities are a medium risk. All the others provide low or very low risks. 
Losing confidentiality and integrity are valued high with the most of the threats because in 
this threat scenario the initial purpose is to discover data. However, the vulnerability factors 
are estimated quite low and the security controls lower the likelihood value even more. 
Table 24: The Full Scenario Table for the confidentiality violation scenario. 
# Threat Security  
Controls (α) 
Impact Factors Vulnerability Factors Risk 
LC LI LA LAC ED EE AW ID  
12 Node capture (C) CE (0.7) 9 9 6 3 6 5 8 2 Medium 
13 Exploitation of 
software 
vulnerabilities 
VME (0.7) 9 9 7 6 4 6 7 5 Medium 
14 Masqueraders SACE, AACE (0.2) 9 8 4 9 8 3 9 7 High 
15 Unauthorized 
user activity 
SACE, AACE (0.8) 8 7 7 8 3 4 5 1 Medium 
16 Unprotected 
network access 
NACE (0.9) 9 3 3 5 3 6 2 2 Low 
17 Unprotected data 
links 
CE (0.7) 7 4 2 7 6 3 2 2 Low 
18 Eavesdropping 
end-user data 
CE (0.7) 9 2 2 8 7 3 5 8 Low 
19 Traffic tracking TSE, CE (0.8) 1 1 1 9 8 7 6 7 Note 
20 Eavesdropping 
control 
messages 
CE (0.7) 7 2 1 8 7 3 5 8 Low 
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The Full Scenario Table of the physical destruction scenario is presented in Table 25. Loss of 
Accountability is estimated to be at the level of 5 meaning that the attacker is possibly 
traceable. Also, The Ease of discovery factor is set to 5 as locating a single network node is 
possible but not always very easy. The Awareness and the Ease of exploit factors have very 
high values because physical destruction is easy to conduct when a target is located. The 
intrusion detection factor is set to 1 as it is quite easy to notice when a node is damaged by 
physical means. The proposed architecture present distributed services and management as 
well as cognitive rerouting which occurs as a high value of the improvement effect (0.9). 
Table 25: The Full Scenario Table for the physical destruction scenario. 
# Threat Security  
Controls (α) 
Impact Factors Vulnerability Factors Risk 
LC LI LA LAC ED EE AW ID  
21 Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical network 
service 
Distributed services 
(0.9)  
1 6 9 5 5 9 9 1 Low 
22 Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical network 
node 
Cognitive packet 
rerouting (0.9) 
1 3 1 5 5 9 9 1 Note 
23 Kinetic 
destruction of a 
critical control 
node 
Distributed 
management (0.9) 
1 3 5 5 5 9 9 1 Note 
24 Non-kinetic 
destruction 
EMP/HPM 
protection (-) 
1 7 8 5 5 9 9 1 High 
 
The table indicates that the risk of losing data or services by physical destruction is low or 
very low in a distributed system. The high risk severity level presented in the table concerns 
non-kinetic destruction (EMP/HPM) for which the proposed architecture contains no 
countermeasures as the EMP and HPM protection is out of the scope of the cyber security 
architecture. However, implementing military networking devices the HPM/EMP protection 
is one of primary requirements. 
6.5. Conclusions 
Evaluating a cyber security architecture is a very challenging issue. Although several different 
evaluation criteria and methods exist, using these methods for technical cyber security is not 
so straightforward.  A problem is that different evaluation criteria are created for auditing 
existing devices. They are not designed for evaluating a high level security architecture with 
functional properties. The reviewed criteria such as Common Criteria are relevant for 
checking a product fulfills its security requirements. The criteria do not set, for example, 
threat scenarios which the security features are tested against. 
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Because of the challenge with the existing evaluation methods, two different approaches were 
chosen to carry out the evaluation of the proposed cyber security architecture. The first 
approach was to use the SABSA framework not for security design but for evaluation. The 
framework contains a broad 360 degree view on enterprise level security. Thus, it was 
interesting to see how the SABSA framework applies to evaluation tasks. The second 
approach uses a scenario based evaluation presented in an academic research paper in 2010. 
The paper describes a framework for calculating risk severity levels of each threat on 
computer software. The framework designed for evaluating software security also looked 
promising for evaluating security of a communication network. 
The chosen evaluation methods were applied to all four threat scenarios with the specific 
threats. Both the methods provided four tables of the evaluation results. The tables show that 
the proposed architecture with the security elements and cognitive capabilities is able to 
mitigate the most of the threats, at least at the high level. As we see in the SABSA evaluation 
matrices, the architecture has functional solutions to mitigate the threats at almost all the 
SABSA layers. The major weaknesses are at the physical layer, but this is natural as physical 
security is not in the scope of the proposed architecture. 
Another weakness concerns the highest layers of the SABSA matrix as those layers deal with 
very high level organizational and business issues that are not discussed and defined in the 
proposed architecture. The cyber security architecture only includes technical functionalities 
for architectural components. However, the cognitive capabilities are able to meet the high 
level challenges in many cases through the end-to-end goals. 
Also, the results of the scenario based evaluation show that the proposed architecture 
mitigates the most of the threats. The risk level with most of the threats is low or very low 
(note). Cryptography, access control and traffic monitoring are key enablers to mitigate the 
threats. The high risk results in the full scenario tables concern masqueraders and non-kinetic 
weapons. Masqueraders (using stolen IDs) are difficult to detect, and it is problematic to 
prevent them to access services and data even if a network has strong security controls. The 
architecture does not contain any protection against non-kinetic weapons, and thus the threat 
causes a high risk.  
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In practice, the evaluation using the chosen methods was very challenging to process, and the 
results must be considered very critically. In the scenario based evaluation both the values of 
the impact and vulnerability factors, and the improvement effects were based on the author’s 
estimations. With certain threats it was hard to estimate for example the level of vulnerability 
or loss of accountability. Similarly, the improvement effect of each security element was 
challenging to exactly estimate, because the evaluation methods included no mathematical 
analysis for calculating the level of protection of a single security element. 
Due to the difficulties with the evaluation methods, the evaluation results must be seen more 
as examples or a demonstration than exact and correct results. The evaluation methods as they 
were applied do not give proper answers to the question of how secure a network is when the 
proposed cyber security architecture is used. In addition to the problem of quantifying 
security, a problem of quantifying the threat is also present. Now, the architecture was 
evaluated against a limited set of threats. In real life, cyber domain sets no limits for attacking 
techniques. 
Adversaries are continuously seeking new vulnerabilities and attacking methods to penetrate 
target systems. When a security control is implemented, the threat may already be changed. 
The proposed cognitive features are ideal for this kind of dynamic threat environments as the 
cognitive process is able to reconfigure the network system to also mitigate the newest threats. 
Although, the evaluation of the cyber security architecture did not produce the most reliable 
results, the results may roughly show that the designed security controls have added value to 
the military network. The results also showed that the evaluation methods and process must 
be developed. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the main research results of the thesis are presented. The chapter also 
discusses on reliability and validity of the study, and defines issues for the future work. The 
aim is to summarize the research results, and to evaluate the quality of the thesis and the 
research process.  
7.1. Research Results 
The main problem of this research was to describe how the cyber security architecture for 
tactical military networking should be designed using the attributes of the cognitive networks. 
The main purpose was to develop an architecture that meets the security requirements and 
utilizes cognitive networking features. An important part of the study was the evaluation of 
the proposed architecture to verify that the architectural solutions are relevant and they 
provide the desired security capabilities. 
As concluded in Chapter 2, the military networking environment is difficult for networking. 
The networks should be mobile, reliable and secure at the same time. NCW requires that the 
networks and information services have enough data processing and sharing capacity, and the 
network is able to maintain continuous connections between the network nodes. To gain 
information superiority a commander and other decision-makers must have relevant 
information services and sources available during a military operation. The military 
information systems must be secured so that information confidentiality, integrity and 
availability are sustained. The systems must support processing information at different 
classification levels (from public to top secret information). 
Cyberspace, cyber warfare and cyber threats, discussed in Chapter 3, are the hot topics of 
media in today’s networked world. Cyberspace extends everywhere with integrated circuits 
and computers. It seems like our physical world does not function without the capabilities of 
cyberspace. Dependency on networks and the Internet also concerns armed forces and their 
operational information systems. This dependency creates new cyber threats to the military 
networks and information systems. Cyberspace is easy to access and operate, and it has also 
become a new playground of nation actors that furiously develop new cyber weapons and 
doctrines to utilize cyberspace. 
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The cyber threat is complex and dynamic. Target systems could be attacked in several ways, 
and the modern attacking methods are very advanced to bypass defensive security controls 
and boundaries. The development of cyber exploits is cost-effective and only requires a deep 
knowledge of computer software and hardware. Cyber warfare requires no massive 
investments to armaments. Also, the mass of potential hostile actors is a huge. Protecting 
military networks demands new innovative approaches in both offensive (proactive) and 
defensive (reactive) manners. 
The challenge with the legacy military networks is that they are often based technologies 
invented and implemented already decades ago. Defensive security measures are later added 
on causing a risk of unmanageable system configurations. The systems suffer the lack of 
overall security management, dynamic security configuration and threat assessment. The 
static configurations and system structures are easier targets to the enemy’s intelligence. It 
would be more benefit to build new information services dynamically so that the systems 
become a moving target to the adversary. 
The cognitive networks, introduced in Chapter 4, are a promising research field to provide 
smart, dynamic, and self-learning networking capabilities. The cognitive process could help 
operating military networks and make them even more secure as the error-sensitive manual 
configuration of the networks is removed. Adaptive and automated network management also 
helps to maintain systems updated and configured to protect the systems against the rapidly 
changing cyber threat. 
Due to the weaknesses of the existing security architecture models and frameworks, a five-
layer cyber security architecture model was presented. The architecture includes the 
infrastructure, service and application security layers consisting of several security elements. 
Each of the elements has its own tasks to provide security controls and protection to provide 
data confidentiality, integrity and availability. The cognitive layer is located upon these three 
layers, and it acts as “brains” for the communication network. The layer controls all the 
security elements, and adapts system parameters dynamically. The fifth layer is a 
management layer at which end-to-end goals are set according to security policies and cyber 
threats. 
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The proposed architecture uses the separated cognitive layer to collect status data and to 
control software defined security elements. The layer runs a cognitive process that improves 
the overall management of security controls and parameters. The cognitive layer also builds 
situational awareness of system security, and the layer is a key element to provide Defense in 
Depth capabilities. The cognitive layer ensures that the network system has continuously 
several protective layers to be passed by an attacker, and countermeasures and offensive 
actions are started immediately during a cyber attack. 
In theory, the architecture solves most of the problem with the legacy military networks. The 
proposed wit the cognitive process enables dynamic network and security configurations. The 
security controls and mechanisms built-in at each network node provide a distributed and 
reliable security services. The cognitive layer is able to provide the overall management of the 
security parameters and configurations including key distribution, encryption algorithms, and 
authentication. The proposed architecture does not define security protocols, hence the lack of 
light-weight security protocols is not removed with the architecture. 
The evaluation of a security architecture is necessary, but also difficult. It is critical to verify 
that the architecture fulfills its requirements. The existing information security criteria proved 
to be impossible to be applied for evaluating a high-level cyber security architecture. 
Available evaluation methods are typically designed for implemented security devices and 
software, and evaluation methods created especially for security architectures could not be 
found. Thus, the proposed architecture was evaluated using two uncommon methods; the 
SABSA matrix and the scenario based evaluation method. The evaluation became very 
challenging, because mathematical analysis could not be applied to the architecture without 
performance parameters or values. 
The both evaluation methods only produced rough evaluation results that must be considered 
very critically. The quality of the architectural design cannot be fully verified basing on the 
results. However, the results show that the proposed architecture includes elements that may 
mitigate the cyber threats with a high probability, but some of the threats such as the 
masqueraders and node capture are still difficult to counter. 
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Quantifying the functionality and performance of the security elements would help analyzing 
the overall quality of a cyber security architecture. Now, the analysis was mostly based on the 
author’s estimation of the capability (improvement effect) of each security element. Similarly, 
the threat impact and vulnerability factors were just roughly estimated without a deeper 
knowledge or mathematical analysis. However, the scenario based evaluation method is 
promising as it uses a mathematical approach for calculating a risk severity level of the 
architecture. 
Finally, the main conclusions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Cyber threat is rapidly growing and changing which means that new approaches to build 
secure military networking systems are required. 
2. The features of the cognitive networks will improve networking capabilities including 
overall network security and threat management. 
3. This study proposes a five-layer cyber security architecture with cognitive control that 
provides appropriate security features and protection for a military network system. 
4. Evaluation a cyber security architecture is not trivial because of lacking relevant evaluation 
methods. The evaluation results are only indicative, and the evaluation processes should be 
considered as examples. 
7.2. Discussion 
The original idea and process of building a new security architecture for tactical military 
networks was quite moderately simple; first, the definition of the cyber threats and security 
requirements, then designing the architecture, and finally the evaluation of the presented 
architecture. However, this straightforward research process proved to be very problematic, 
especially in the evaluation phase.  Two major weaknesses of the research method concern the 
evaluation method and architecture modeling. Because of these fragilities, the research results 
are not as high quality as it was thought in the beginning of the study, but the quality of the 
results does not make this research unnecessary. It must be remembered that this kind of 
research of building and evaluation a technical security architecture could not be found  in 
literature or academic research. 
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In Chapter 2, the thesis tried to draw a picture how modern military information systems 
require a lot of communication and networking resources. Command and control systems are 
continuously developed to support commanders’ leadership and management activities. A 
challenge is that the developers of information systems often forget security issues typically 
in a brainstorming phase. It is almost impossible to add reliable security features to the system 
after it is already implemented. One small purpose of this study was to focus on security 
issues from the beginning of the network design and implementation. 
The design goals and security dimensions were set as the requirements for cyber security in 
the military networks. However, the design goals may vary a lot at the different levels of 
warfighting, and their relevance could be repudiated. Also, using the security dimensions as 
the designing requirements could be considered critically. Now, all the dimensions had an 
equal weight for designing and evaluating the architecture. We may critically ask for example, 
are availability and confidentiality equally important in all situations at the battlefield? Data 
and communication privacy demands may be much higher than e.g. availability in a case that 
discovered data will cause the loss of human life. 
In Chapter 3, the thesis represents the cyber threats concerning the military communication 
networks, and the challenges of the legacy military networking systems. The chapter 
describes the phenomena of cyberspace, cyber warfare and cyber threats to show how 
challenging the cyber domain is. One of the purposes was to describe security threat scenarios 
that are used in the architecture evaluation phase. The scenarios were based on the idea of that 
the enemy has always a certain reason for attacking. This resulted in four scenarios with a 
number of threats: integrity violation, prevention of availability, confidentiality violation and 
physical destruction. The dynamic nature of cyber threats causes problems to the scenario 
based approach. The list of threats in each scenario is difficult to maintain up-to-date. Another 
weakness is that the scenarios do not define an attacking process or phases in details. Thus, in 
the evaluation phase, it is challenging to show how the threats are defended in practice. 
The current cyber threats and the challenges of implementing security controls into the 
military information systems and networks are relevant reasons for designing a cyber security 
architecture. A problem was that the existing frameworks and models are not created for this 
kind of use, and thus a layered block diagram was used to illustrate the overall security 
architecture. It can be criticized if it is even possible to describe a technical cyber security 
architecture in this way. At least, the evaluation showed that the functionality of the security 
elements and the cognitive and management layers must be described more precisely. The 
thesis does not also specify connections and relationships between the architectural elements. 
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Building and implementing security in networking devices and systems is a demanding work. 
A dilemma is that the more we add new features to build a system without security holes the 
more complex and vulnerable the networking systems become. Therefore, network security 
must be considered through risk management which is actually one of the key areas where the 
cognitive networks may be benefit. With the features of the cognitive networks the security 
elements could be controlled dynamically using intelligent and self-learning processes. 
Obviously, the cognitive functionality reduces the need of human network operators that 
sensitive to make errors. The proposed cyber security architecture provides lots of benefits, 
and it seems to solve the problems with the current military networks, but the implementation 
of the architecture may turn to be impossible in a sense of complexity. 
Are the cognitive networks only alternative, and is it even possible to implement the cognitive 
feature? The cognitive networks may not be the only choices, but it is sure that new security 
devices and software becomes more and more sophisticated every day. Automated 
functionality of cyber security systems is already normal today, and the automated features 
will increase in the future. Currently, firewalls and IDS/IPS devices have lots of automated 
features in virus scanning and traffic monitoring. The cognitive networks are just an overall 
approach to provide cognitive processing at all the layers of networking systems. It is hard to 
see that future security features are developed without any self-learning or automated 
functionalities. 
The structure of the security controls at each architectural layer can also be criticized. The 
study does not present a sub process for designing the proposed security elements. The design 
of the block diagram is just based on the requirement of different types of tasks needed to 
protect data against violations. A progressive thing is that the elements can easily be removed, 
modified and added to fulfill the requirements. Anyhow, the implementation of the 
architecture will likely be the case for major modifications to the architecture. 
The thesis introduces the new features and benefits provided by the cognitive networks. 
Drawbacks are not analyzed systematically, although it is clear that the implementation of 
cognitive processes is not an easy task. The complexity of the system increases enormously. 
Every single security control must be software-programmable which causes a lot of new 
software code to be run, and new potential targets to be vulnerable. Securing the cognitive 
process itself will be an interesting issue. Violating the process the entire network may 
collapse. 
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What are the controls that protect the cognitive process? This thesis does not attempt to 
answer the question. Security controls that protect the cognitive process must be less 
vulnerable than those the process controls. This may require totally new operating systems 
and applications. 
The evaluation of a cyber security architecture is significant, but a question is how the 
evaluation process and results can be enhanced. This thesis proves that the evaluation of this 
type of architecture is challenging. The evaluation process was clear but lots of values were 
based on estimation, not on measured performance values. Next versions of the architecture 
should describe performance values, algorithms and protocols that could be tested against the 
threat scenarios that include attack phases and methods. The benefits of the evaluation of the 
security architecture may be small without simulations or prototyping. It could also be wise to 
implement and evaluate a part of the architecture at the time or to simulate the system layer by 
layer.  
As the evaluation results are not very high-quality, and also the evaluation process and the 
architecture design requires more research, this thesis could be seen as a process description 
how to build security architectures. The results could be seen as examples of verifying the 
architectural properties. The developed architecture modeling and evaluation can be utilized 
in real life development projects under certain boundary conditions. 
Although the results of the thesis are not fully satisfactory, it is very important to seek new 
approaches to overcome the modern cyber threat. We can be sure we will need all our 
technological knowledge and research to develop military networks that are reliable and 
resistance against cyber attacks. It is hard to see that an enemy would stop seeking 
vulnerabilities and developing new methods or weapons for cyber warfare. 
7.3. Future Work 
The results of this study cause a lots of needs for further research work. Future work can 
roughly be divided into four categories. The first is to improve the proposed architecture 
which includes both the functionalities and more precise definitions etc. The presented 
architectural design describes only high level functionalities hath are difficult to evaluate. 
Thus it is more than necessary to plan and design more detailed functionality for each security 
element. The future work should include the development of formalized (mathematical) 
description for these functions. Also, the relationship between the security elements and 
architecture layer would be interesting to study and define.  
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The second is the development of the evaluation processes. The development could include 
either the improvement of the applied methods or the introduction of new methods. With the 
SABSA method, the development needs concern the objects of the layers and the overall 
demand to use all the layers for evaluation. Developing the scenario based evaluation could 
include more research about the vulnerability and impact factors and how those are valued 
against each threat. Also, the estimation of improvement effect of each security element 
requires more research. For new evaluation methods, the common criteria could be studied 
and developed more so that the modified CC could be applied for the cyber security 
architecture evaluation. 
The third category for the future work is the cognitive layer and its capabilities. Many features 
of the presented cyber security architecture rely on the cognitive process. The further research 
should focus on decision-making algorithms, input and output data of the process and the 
control channel problematic. Algorithm research could focus on optimization methods and 
algorithms. Input and output data is critical for the decision making algorithms, and are also 
important to describe what information and how fast it is necessary to collect when talking 
about security of the military networking. Data collection uses network resources, but lack of 
data impairs the ability of decision-making. 
The fourth category contains the work that develops the threat scenarios. The chosen 
scenarios were rough and simple, and they did not include any detailed information about 
attack phases, methods and tools. Developing the scenarios would improve the evaluation 
results and their reliability. More detailed threat scenarios would better illustrate real life 
situations of cyberspace and cyber warfare. 
Future work also includes simulations and prototyping that are important when the maturity 
of the technology is evaluated. The simulations can be conducted using a step-by-step 
approach in which a security element is simulated and tested at a time. Prototyping can reveal 
implementation issues that cannot be found in the simulations. 
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